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Pamela K. Bookman* 
Over the past two decades, U.S. courts have pursued a studied avoidance of 
transnational litigation. The resulting litigation isolationism appears to be driven 
by courts’ desire to promote separation of powers, international comity, and the 
interests of defendants. This Article demonstrates, however, that this new kind of 
“avoidance” in fact frequently undermines not only these values but also other 
significant U.S. interests by continuing to interfere with foreign relations and 
driving plaintiffs to sue in foreign courts.  
This Article offers four contributions: First, it focuses the conversation about 
transnational litigation on those doctrines designed to avoid it—that is, doctrines 
that permit or require courts to dismiss a case based on its “foreignness.” Doing 
so helps to identify the particular concerns justifying this kind of avoidance and 
to evaluate them on their own terms. Second, the Article presents evidence of 
emerging foreign trends that increasingly (and surprisingly) permit traditionally 
American, plaintiff-friendly procedures, including higher damages awards, ag-
gregate litigation, and third-party litigation financing. Third, the Article demon-
strates that, particularly in light of these foreign trends, avoidance has failed to 
achieve its stated goals, and in many instances has undermined them. Finally, the 
Article suggests ways to refine avoidance doctrines to address these unintended 
consequences. Its more basic and urgent task, however, is to identify the growing 
phenomenon of litigation isolationism, highlight its perversities, and caution 
against its further expansion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the 1990s, thousands of banana workers sued Dow Chemical Company 
in courts throughout the United States over alleged exposure to DBCP, a Dow-
manufactured pesticide claimed to cause sterility. 1 Dow fought for years to 
have the cases dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds, arguing that the 
workers’ home countries’ courts would be the more natural forum for these 
suits.2 It did so likely assuming that once dismissed from U.S. court, the cases 
would effectively be over, because the plaintiffs’ home courts held no promise 
 
 1. See generally Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324, 1335-40 (S.D. Tex. 
1995), aff’d, 231 F.3d 165 (5th Cir. 2000); Jonathan C. Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree, Think 
Globally, Sue Locally: Trends and Out-of-Court Tactics in Transnational Tort Actions, 29 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 456, 489-90 (2011). Dow and Shell Oil Company manufactured 
DBCP, and either or both were named as defendants in the litigations. See, e.g., Sibaja v. 
Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215, 1216 (11th Cir. 1985). 
 2. See Winston Anderson, Forum Non Conveniens Checkmated?—The Emergence of 
Retaliatory Legislation, 10 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 183, 191 (2001). 
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of damages awards sufficient to make it worthwhile to continue litigating.3 But 
after a series of forum non conveniens dismissals, Nicaragua enacted a special 
law to enable its nationals to obtain U.S.-style relief for DBCP injuries (requir-
ing, for example, a minimum damages award of $125,000 based on minimal 
evidentiary showings). 4  Nicaraguan courts issued over $2 billion in judg-
ments.5 
Back in U.S. court, Dow appeared to have “forum shopper’s remorse” over 
having requested dismissal.6 It sued groups of Nicaraguan plaintiffs, seeking a 
declaratory judgment that it was not liable for their injuries and that the Nicara-
guan judgments were unenforceable.7 These attempts failed for lack of person-
al jurisdiction over the Nicaraguan “plaintiffs” (now the defendants in the de-
claratory judgment action). 8 When Nicaraguan plaintiffs later sued Dow to 
enforce a similar Nicaraguan judgment in Florida, that court made the highly 
unusual move of refusing to enforce the judgment because (among other 
things) it was “rendered under a system which does not provide . . . procedures 
compatible with the requirements of due process.”9 Had the foreign procedures 
had some bare hallmarks of legitimacy, however, U.S. courts likely would have 
rubber-stamped the foreign judgments. U.S. states have relatively permissive 
regimes for enforcing foreign money judgments.10  
The DBCP case is just one of many examples of the transnational cases 
that abound in U.S. courts.11 Transnational suits—cases involving foreign par-
 
 3. See Donald Earl Childress III, Forum Conveniens: The Search for a Convenient 
Forum in Transnational Cases, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 157, 161 (2012) (“A successful forum non 
conveniens motion means that the case will not be heard in the United States and may not be 
heard elsewhere.”). This conventional wisdom is often traced back to a 1987 study substanti-
ating these assumptions. See David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and 
England: “A Rather Fantastic Fiction,” 103 LAW Q. REV. 398, 417-21 (1987). 
 4. See Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d 
sub nom. Osorio v. Dow Chem. Co., 635 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 5. Id. at 1312-13. 
 6. See Michael D. Goldhaber, Forum Shopper’s Remorse, CORP. COUNS., Apr. 2010, 
at 63. 
 7. Dow Chem. Co. v. Calderon, 422 F.3d 827, 829 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 8. Id. at 836. 
 9. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1352 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 55.605(1)(a)) (internal quo-
tation mark omitted). 
 10. See Linda J. Silberman, The Impact of Jurisdictional Rules and Recognition Prac-
tice on International Business Transactions: The U.S. Regime, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 327, 352 
(2004); Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens and 
the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1470 (2011). 
 11. See generally Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and 
the Next Wave of Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709 (2012). This Article focuses 
primarily on transnational litigation arising out of noncontractual relationships—for exam-
ple, when U.S. parties are injured by a foreign-manufactured product. Contractual relation-
ships often involve both parties’ consent to a particular forum. U.S. courts’ studied avoid-
ance of transnational litigation outside the contractual context seems to contrast with their 
steady encouragement of the use of arbitration and forum selection clauses. See BG Grp. v. 
Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1203-04 (2014) (recognizing more authority for ar-
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ties, foreign conduct, foreign law, or foreign effects—and the law that governs 
them have growing significance in the United States and around the world.12 
There are countless other examples. Plaintiffs sue U.S. manufacturers alleging 
that their airplanes crashed overseas due to propellers malfunctioning.13 They 
sue alleging that foreign-owned companies plotted securities fraud in the Unit-
ed States.14 They sue alleging that foreign firms exported dangerous products 
to the United States that caused injury there.15 Perhaps most controversially, 
they sue alleging that corporations aided and abetted human rights violations in 
foreign countries.16  
In such cases, defendants, like Dow, whether they are foreign or domestic, 
typically rely on a set of defenses that I call “transnational litigation avoidance 
doctrines,”17 or “avoidance doctrines” for short. These defenses—most promi-
nently, lack of personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, “abstention comi-
ty” (the power to abstain based on international comity concerns), and the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality—permit or require a court to dismiss a case 
because it is too “foreign.”18 
Over the past few decades, American courts have become increasingly re-
sponsive to requests like these, expanding the salience of avoidance doctrines. 
These doctrines represent a hodgepodge of approaches to the decision of 
whether to entertain transnational litigation, addressing prescriptive jurisdic-
 
bitrators); Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 582 (2013) (“[F]orum-
selection clauses should control except in unusual cases.”). The relationship between these 
two trends is worthy of further analysis but outside the scope of this Article.  
 12. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters, 24 PENN ST. INT’L 
L. REV. 745, 747 (2006); Austen Parrish, Duplicative Foreign Litigation, 78 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 237, 238-39 (2010). 
 13. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 238-39 (1981). 
 14. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 252 (2010).  
 15. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011) (plurality 
opinion). 
 16. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 (2013). 
 17. See Pamela K. Bookman, Once and Future U.S. Litigation, in FOREIGN COURT 
JUDGMENTS AND THE UNITED STATES LEGAL SYSTEM 35, 36-37 (Paul B. Stephan ed., 2014) 
(describing forum non conveniens, forum selection clauses, comity, personal jurisdiction, 
and the political question doctrine as “transnational litigation avoidance doctrines”); cf. 
George A. Bermann, Parallel Jurisdiction: Is Convergence Possible?, 13 Y.B. PRIV. INT’L 
L. 21, 23-28 (2011) (discussing “[i]nstruments of [s]elf-[r]estraint”); Lea Brilmayer, Interna-
tional Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 YALE L.J. 2277, 2289 (1991) (dis-
cussing doctrines that could be included in this category, such as the act of state doctrine, 
standing, and the limited enforcement of non-self-executing treaties).  
 18. At some level, these avoidance doctrines all speak to the nexus between the United 
States, the parties, and a given suit. Personal jurisdiction doctrine requires a sufficient nexus 
between “the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2798 (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)) (internal quota-
tion mark omitted). Forum non conveniens and abstention comity compare a litigation’s 
nexus to the forum state with its nexus to other potentially interested nations. The presump-
tion against extraterritoriality assumes that where conduct occurred abroad, that nexus is in-
sufficient without a clear indication from Congress that it intended to regulate that conduct.  
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tion,19 adjudicative jurisdiction,20 and discretionary bases. But they all have a 
common effect: the dismissal of a case at least in part because of its “foreign-
ness.” And careful analysis of the cases reveals that they all purport to serve a 
common set of goals: promoting separation of powers and international comity 
(by keeping the courts away from disputes involving delicate foreign affairs is-
sues), and protecting the interests of defendants (by sparing them the burdens 
of transnational litigation in U.S. courts).21 I call this combination of common 
stated goals and effects “litigation isolationism.”22 
Some scholars have begun to take note of the Supreme Court’s transna-
tional litigation avoidance decisions. David Noll, for example, argues that de-
velopments in avoidance doctrines and other areas of the law have created a 
new way in which U.S. courts manage regulatory conflict.23 As Noll recogniz-
es,24 these developments can be explained as part of a larger trend of growing 
“hostility to litigation,” which some scholars believe has driven many decisions 
by the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts,25 but this is not the only explanation. As 
consequences of these and other developments, scholars have identified de-
creased burdens for foreign defendants in U.S. courts,26 an emerging market 
for transnational law,27 and an evolving forum shopping system in which U.S. 
courts are losing popularity.28  
 
 19. Prescriptive jurisdiction refers to a nation’s power “to make its law applicable” to 
persons or things—for example, by legislation or court determination. RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 (1987). 
 20. Adjudicative jurisdiction refers to a nation’s power “to subject persons or things to 
the process of its courts.” Id. 
 21. To be sure, some of these doctrines also have other aims, such as judicial efficien-
cy and fairness. But these goals animate the transnational litigation avoidance trend as a 
whole. 
 22. By other definitions, the United States exhibits the opposite of isolationism. 
Delphine Nougayrède characterizes judicial isolationism as being based on courts’ 
nonrecognition of foreign judgments and negative attitude toward arbitration. See Delphine 
Nougayrède, Outsourcing Law in Post-Soviet Russia, 6 J. EURASIAN L. 383, 439-40 (2013) 
(arguing that Russia is judicially isolationist). By these measures, the United States is one of 
the most anti-isolationist legal systems in the world.  
 23. See David L. Noll, The New Conflicts Law, 2 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 41, 43 
(2014). 
 24. Id. at 82, 83 & n.245. 
 25. See, e.g., Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation 
as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 
1108 (2006) (defining the term); A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Proce-
dure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353, 368 (2010). 
 26. See Stephen B. Burbank, International Civil Litigation in U.S. Courts: Becoming a 
Paper Tiger?, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 663 (2012) (focusing on developments in personal juris-
diction, class actions, and pleading standards). 
 27. See Donald Earl Childress III, Escaping Federal Law in Transnational Cases: The 
Brave New World of Transnational Litigation, 93 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2015). 
 28. See Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL 
L. REV. 481, 497-98 (2011) (focusing on developments in personal jurisdiction and choice of 
law). 
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But scholarship has thus far neglected to focus on those doctrines that tar-
get transnational litigation and their particular stated goals. Nor has it assessed 
whether the doctrines are even capable of achieving these goals either on their 
own terms or in the context of foreign courts’ evolving attitudes toward trans-
national litigation.29  
This Article evaluates these questions. It starts by placing transnational lit-
igation avoidance doctrines in context—vis-à-vis both each other and the 
changing transnational litigation landscape abroad. Understanding this context 
is essential to ensuring that these doctrines work toward establishing a level of 
transnational litigation in U.S. courts that is consistent not only with separation 
of powers and international comity, but also with U.S. sovereign interests, fair-
ness, and efficiency (if not “convenience”) for all parties.  
The Article then seeks to fill these gaps in courts’ and scholars’ under-
standings of the role of avoidance doctrines in transnational litigation. It evalu-
ates the success of avoidance on the doctrines’ own terms and concludes that 
avoidance either fails to serve or positively undermines the values that the doc-
trines purport to advance. It concludes that the doctrines tend to be overbroad. 
In seeking to exclude cases that are “too foreign,” courts end up dismissing 
cases that are in fact quite domestic. When a case involves American parties or 
events on U.S. territory, the United States is likely to have a strong interest in 
having that case proceed in U.S. court and in applying its procedures, and the 
public policies behind them, to the suit.30 By excluding those cases along with 
others that lack almost any domestic contacts, courts are forgoing their ability 
to apply those procedures to such cases. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the four avoidance doc-
trines highlighted here and their common effects and stated goals. It traces the 
history of the American view of what kind of nexus is required to permit a case 
to proceed in U.S. courts from its origins in territoriality to the incorporation of 
international law concepts of reasonableness and, in recent years, a partial re-
turn to territoriality. This Part demonstrates that, in the name of preserving sep-
aration of powers, international comity, and defendants’ convenience, courts 
have developed broad rules that exclude substantial amounts of litigation that 
the United States has a sovereign interest in keeping in U.S. courts.  
 
 29. In a forthcoming article, Donald Childress focuses on developments in extraterrito-
riality, personal jurisdiction, pleading standards, class action rules, and forum non 
conveniens, recommending increased regulatory cooperation as a solution to issues related to 
transnational forum shopping. See Childress, supra note 27. This Article, by contrast, ex-
plores in greater depth those doctrines that have evolved in the transnational context and 
identifies their common motivations as they relate to transnational challenges. It evaluates 
the success of those goals on their own terms, and considers prescriptions directed at courts, 
assuming that the regulatory cooperation that Childress envisions, while perhaps preferable 
in an ideal world, is an unrealistic option in the near future. 
 30. This is separate from the choice-of-law question that, in some states, evaluates 
which state has the strongest interest in having its substantive law apply. See SYMEON C. 
SYMEONIDES, CODIFYING CHOICE OF LAW AROUND THE WORLD: AN INTERNATIONAL 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 42-44 (2014); infra note 279. 
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Part II places these developments in a global context. It describes foreign 
courts’ growing attractiveness to transnational litigants. Political scientists and 
legal academics have begun to document the rise of American-style litigation 
features in many foreign countries, especially in Europe and Canada. These 
features include, most prominently, higher damages awards, aggregate litiga-
tion, and alternative litigation funding. This Part brings together insights from 
political science and legal scholarship with analysis of trends in foreign sub-
stantive law and prescriptive jurisdiction rules. It shows that foreign courts are 
growing more attractive as a forum not just for civil litigation in general, but 
also for transnational litigation in particular. The resulting legal landscape is 
one in which plaintiffs have increasingly diverse options for bringing suits. The 
rise of American litigation isolationism, therefore, encourages plaintiffs not on-
ly to sue abroad once a case is dismissed from a U.S. court, but also to sue 
abroad instead of suing in a U.S. court, or at the same time in a parallel litiga-
tion. 
Part III analyzes whether avoidance doctrines have achieved their stated 
goals of protecting separation of powers, international comity, and the interests 
of defendants. It concludes that, particularly in light of the foreign develop-
ments described in Part II, avoidance falls short on all of these counts. Instead, 
the doctrines undermine both these values and other important U.S. sovereign 
interests. First, judicially driven avoidance developments are ill equipped to 
address the separation of powers and international comity concerns motivating 
avoidance because those concerns are largely a consequence of federal courts, 
rather than the political branches, deciding what transnational litigation will 
find a home in U.S. courts. So long as federal courts continue to make avoid-
ance decisions, some separation of powers concerns will persist. And so long as 
they make them without appreciation for the international context, international 
comity concerns will also persist. 
Second, the assumption that avoidance will protect defendants from the in-
convenience of transnational litigation is similarly misplaced in light of emerg-
ing trends in foreign courts. The increasingly competitive market for transna-
tional litigation reflected in these trends suggests that defendant “convenience” 
(as opposed to defendant fairness or judicial efficiency) is an unrealistic goal. 
Now more than ever, most plaintiff forum shopping should be understood as a 
strategic choice rather than a plot to vex and harass. This is particularly true 
when suing a defendant in its home forum, which has indicia of convenience 
and fairness for the defendant. Avoidance doctrines nevertheless dismiss trans-
national suits, even against U.S. defendants, in the name of defendant conven-
ience. As a result, avoidance drives plaintiffs to bring transnational suits abroad 
not only after dismissal, but also in the first instance or in parallel with U.S. lit-
igation, subjecting defendants to foreign courts, where they may fare no better 
than in U.S. courts and where they may face other challenges.  
Avoidance also has serious consequences for U.S. sovereign interests. For 
example, avoidance fosters suits in U.S. courts to enforce foreign judgments. 
Because of the fairly lax American regime for enforcing foreign money judg-
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ments, U.S. courts are likely to enforce these judgments even if a U.S. court 
hearing the case would have evaluated it differently or applied a different sub-
stantive law. Likewise, avoidance doctrines practically encourage courts to 
dismiss transnational cases even if they involve American parties or events or 
harms that occurred in the United States. As a result, courts forgo the oppor-
tunity to apply American procedures, choice-of-law rules, and sometimes even 
substantive law to such cases. 
Finally, Part IV proposes substantive doctrinal shifts to address these unin-
tended consequences. It suggests that the stated goals of avoidance, as well as 
other U.S. sovereign interests, would be better served if courts recognized not 
only a ceiling on domestic courts providing a forum for suits that have insuffi-
cient domestic contacts, but also a presumptive floor of providing a forum for 
suits that have a baseline level of contacts, relying on the internationally ac-
cepted concepts of territoriality and personality (i.e., nationality or domicile). 
The best way to implement this idea would be through federal legislation in-
formed by international cooperation or treaty. But such efforts in this area have 
foundered, and so, in their absence, this Part addresses how courts should de-
fine and exercise their discretion. 
Part IV approves of the Supreme Court’s recent innovations in general per-
sonal jurisdiction. But it suggests broadening specific personal jurisdiction. It 
advocates reversing the premises inherent in today’s forum non conveniens 
doctrine to create a presumption in favor of exercising jurisdiction over U.S. 
defendants. It also recommends refining abstention comity to reflect a modified 
lis pendens approach, usually favoring the first-filed suit where there is parallel 
duplicative litigation, but maintaining some discretion with the court to retain 
later-filed cases. With respect to extraterritoriality, it considers adopting one of 
two possible replacements for that canon that might better address avoidance’s 
stated goals: a presumption that federal statutes regulate U.S. nationals, even 
when they are abroad, or a presumption that federal statutes do not violate in-
ternational law. 
I. TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 
Several scholars have noted that the Supreme Court has exhibited a general 
hostility to litigation over the past few decades.31 Whether as a byproduct of 
this sentiment or a consequence of a related but separate hostility to suits seen 
as having insufficient contacts with the United States,32 courts have been push-
ing away transnational litigation in particular. But scholarly accounts thus far 
have failed to focus on the doctrines that specifically exclude transnational liti-
gation or to judge their success on their own metrics in light of how they inter-
act with each other and with global trends.33 This Part addresses the first step in 
 
 31. See supra note 25. 
 32. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 26, at 664. 
 33. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.  
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meeting that challenge: explaining the history of transnational litigation avoid-
ance doctrines and the motivating forces behind their recent and growing influ-
ence. 
Four doctrines exemplify U.S. courts’ avoidance of transnational litigation: 
personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, abstention comity, and the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality.34 The doctrines address different aspects of 
a court’s power to hear a case: personal jurisdiction considers a court’s adjudi-
cative power over the defendant; forum non conveniens and abstention comity 
afford courts a discretionary basis for declining to exercise jurisdiction; and ex-
traterritoriality goes to the scope of a statutory cause of action, or, in interna-
tional law terms, the legislature’s power to regulate (i.e., prescriptive jurisdic-
tion). These doctrines are disparate as a matter of judicial institutionalism: the 
personal jurisdiction limitations have developed as a form of constitutional in-
terpretation directed primarily by the Supreme Court; forum non conveniens 
and abstention comity are discretionary, nonstatutory doctrines developed 
mostly by trial courts; and the anti-extraterritoriality presumption is a canon of 
statutory interpretation developed by the Supreme Court, often over the protests 
of lower courts.35  
But each provides a mechanism for deciding a case—for the defendant—
based on the dispute’s “foreignness.” Considered together, especially in their 
modern incarnations, avoidance doctrines create powerful tools for courts to 
avoid adjudicating transnational disputes. In many cases, they are interchange-
able means of achieving this end; in others, they provide backstops for each 
other when one does not apply, making dismissal of transnational suits all the 
more likely.36  
The doctrines are united not only in effect, but also by the values that 
courts say motivate them. In the decisions advancing avoidance, courts speak 
of preserving separation of powers, ensuring international comity, and prevent-
ing inconvenience for defendants. This Article takes courts at their word when 
they articulate these primary goals. It does so not only because the courts’ ex-
pressed goals are good indications of their actual goals, but also because, even 
if the courts have other agendas, it is worthwhile to evaluate whether avoidance 
 
 34. Some other doctrines that can be described as avoidance doctrines, such as the po-
litical question doctrine or the act of state doctrine, have not been gaining strength in recent 
years or are not motivated by all three of the same stated ambitions. See, e.g., Curtis A. 
Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Con-
straint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1131 & n.122 (2013) (noting recent narrowing of the po-
litical question doctrine); John T. Parry, International Extradition, the Rule of Non-Inquiry, 
and the Problem of Sovereignty, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1973, 2001 n.110 (2010) (noting that the 
Court has construed the act of state doctrine narrowly). 
 35. Thanks to Paul Stephan for highlighting these distinctions. 
 36. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1674 (2013) (Breyer, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that forum non conveniens and comity provide 
grounds for dismissing Alien Tort Statute suits); Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping 
Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 427 (2007) (“Sinochem moved to dismiss the suit on . . . lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, and international comity [grounds].”). 
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has achieved or can achieve even courts’ stated aims. Part III will show that lit-
igation isolationism, the result of these avoidance developments, has failed to 
accomplish these ambitions, and that, in the process, it has also undermined 
important U.S. sovereign interests. 
A. The Growth of Transnational Litigation Avoidance 
In the late nineteenth century, principles of territoriality—the idea that sov-
ereign power was confined by its territorial limits—governed courts’ authority 
to hear cases and legislatures’ authority to regulate.37 By the mid-twentieth 
century, however, both domestic and international law recognized that this con-
cept was outdated and ineffective.38 It was replaced by a reasonableness stand-
ard that evaluated the factors connecting the case and the parties to the court, as 
well as conflicts among sovereign interests.39 
This occurred with respect to both adjudicative and prescriptive jurisdic-
tion.40 Because of the broad American conceptions of this inquiry41 and other 
distinctive features of the American legal system, U.S. courts became plain-
tiffs’ first choice for bringing transnational litigation.42 There were several rea-
sons for this preference. U.S. courts offered the promise of large damages 
awards, including the possibility of punitive damages.43 On the merits, U.S. 
law was thought to offer greater chances for recovery.44 And U.S. choice-of-
law rules were thought to favor U.S. laws, even for torts occurring overseas, 
which made plaintiff-friendly American substantive provisions more likely to 
apply. 45 Plaintiffs also favored U.S. courts because they entertained opt-out 
 
 37. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909). 
 38. See, e.g., Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 
24 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1, 21-59 (1992).  
 39. Id. at 33-34. 
 40. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (adjudicative jurisdiction); infra note 
103 and accompanying text (prescriptive jurisdiction); see also Walter W. Heiser, Toward 
Reasonable Limitations on the Exercise of General Jurisdiction, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1035, 1055 (2004) (arguing that the forum non conveniens analysis is, “to a large extent, the 
same” as a due process reasonableness analysis). 
 41. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 
1945). 
 42. Lord Denning famously remarked, “As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant 
drawn to the United States.” Smith Kline & French Labs. Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730 
(A.C.) at 733 (Eng.). 
 43. See, e.g., Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition 
of Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 142, 149 (2006); Russell J. Weintraub, 
International Litigation and Forum Non Conveniens, 29 TEX. INT’L L.J. 321, 323 (1994).  
 44. See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, Transnational Forum Shopping as a Trade and Invest-
ment Issue, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 339, 341-42 (2008). 
 45. See Whytock, supra note 28, at 490-91. For the purposes of this Article, I hold 
constant certain conventional wisdom about choice-of-law rules, including that some U.S. 
states, at least some of the time, favor forum law. See Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of 
Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 719, 732-33 (2009) (sum-
marizing scholarship regarding pro-domestic-law bias and pro-domestic-party bias held by 
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class actions, required parties to pay their own legal fees, permitted contingen-
cy fees, allowed extensive pretrial discovery, and took a broad approach to per-
sonal jurisdiction and the extraterritorial reach of federal statutes.46 Most for-
eign fora lacked most if not all of these (widely criticized) characteristics.47  
In the past two decades, however, courts have been restricting the accessi-
bility of transnational litigation to U.S. courts. Most relevant here, with respect 
to both adjudicative and prescriptive jurisdiction, courts have retreated back to 
territoriality. But they have done so in ways that are insensitive to issues of 
personality (i.e., nationality or residence) and the needs of American parties. 
1. Personal jurisdiction 
The evolution of personal jurisdiction is a tale of the journey away from 
territoriality and back again.48  
In the late nineteenth century, personal jurisdiction required a defendant to 
be present within the forum.49 By the mid-twentieth century, however, courts 
could exercise jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants so long as they had 
“minimum contacts” with the forum state.50 In 1987, the Court added a “rea-
sonableness” inquiry to the specific jurisdiction analysis in light of a case’s “in-
ternational context.”51 That step could be seen as adding to the analysis an el-
ement of international comity52 (informed by international law) in cases with 
foreign defendants.53  
In general jurisdiction cases, the inquiry in lower courts also often focused 
on reasonableness. Before 2011, many lower courts had determined the general 
jurisdiction question by considering first whether a defendant’s contacts with a 
forum were sufficiently “continuous and systematic” to render it subject to the 
 
judges and inherent in modern U.S. choice-of-law rules, but arguing that these biases are 
overblown and in fact not present in transnational cases). For an example of proposed 
changes to choice-of-law rules, including the possibility of federalizing choice-of-law ques-
tions in transnational cases, see Donald Earl Childress III, When Erie Goes International, 
105 NW. U. L. REV. 1531, 1574-75 (2011). Such issues are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 46. See, e.g., Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of Law: The Im-
pact of Applying Foreign Law in Transnational Tort Actions, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1161, 1184 
(2005). 
 47. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, The Legal-Economic Analysis of Comparative Civil 
Procedure, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 905, 908 (1997); see also John H. Langbein, The German 
Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 823 (1985) (noting criticisms of “the 
expense and complexity of [U.S.] modes of discovery and trial”).  
 48. Cf. J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE HOBBIT, OR THERE AND BACK AGAIN (1937). See generally 
4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 1065 (3d ed. 2001). 
 49. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1878). 
 50. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 51. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987).  
 52. See discussion infra Part I.A.3. 
 53. Linda J. Silberman, Goodyear and Nicastro: Observations from a Transnational 
and Comparative Perspective, 63 S.C. L. REV. 591, 594 (2012).  
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forum’s jurisdiction, and then whether that assertion of jurisdiction would be 
“reasonable.” 54  Under this analysis, a company like Starbucks, which has 
stores, and therefore contacts, in every state, could be sued anywhere in the 
country for conduct anywhere in the world. International opinion criticized 
contacts-based general jurisdiction as exorbitant.55 In many foreign nations, on-
ly a defendant’s home forum has general jurisdiction over the defendant.56  
In two recent cases, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown57 
and Daimler AG v. Bauman, 58  the Court narrowed the general jurisdiction 
question to whether the corporate defendant is “at home” in the forum state.59 
What does “at home” mean?60 The Court suggested that a corporation’s 
home has similar characteristics to its place of incorporation and principal place 
of business,61 and that it will be difficult to establish general jurisdiction out-
side of these two places.62 This likely reduces the possible states with general 
jurisdiction over Starbucks to one—Washington—where it is both incorporated 
and headquartered. The decision also seems to assume that American compa-
nies will be subject to personal jurisdiction somewhere in the United States. 
The “at home” standard thus will exclude a significant amount of transna-
tional litigation arising from foreign conduct by foreign defendants.63 Compa-
nies that are neither incorporated nor headquartered in the United States likely 
 
 54. See, e.g., Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 920 (9th Cir. 2011), 
rev’d sub nom. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014); Heiser, supra note 40, at 
1042 & n.26 (collecting lower court cases including reasonableness in the general jurisdic-
tion analysis).  
 55. See Heiser, supra note 40, at 1036-38. 
 56. Ronald A. Brand, Access-to-Justice Analysis on a Due Process Platform, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 76, 78 (2012), http://columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads 
/2012/04/76_Brand.pdf. 
 57. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).  
 58. 134 S. Ct. 746. 
 59. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851; Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751. 
 60. Alan Trammell has argued that the Court’s definition of “at home” likely does not 
go beyond a corporation’s principal place of business or place of incorporation. See Alan M. 
Trammell, A Tale of Two Jurisdictions, 68 VAND. L. REV. 501, 516 (2015). This definition 
makes the concept similar to other countries’ conception of “domicile.” See Council Regula-
tion 44/2001, art. 60(1), 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1, 13 (EC) (defining domicile as the place where a 
legal entity has its “(a) statutory seat, or (b) central administration, or (c) principal place of 
business”).  
 61. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760. 
 62. See id. at 760-61; see also Trammell, supra note 60, at 21. But cf. Daimler, 134 S. 
Ct. at 761 n.19 (suggesting that a corporation could be at home in some third place “in an 
exceptional case”). 
 63. See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 136 (2d Cir. 2014); Sonera 
Holding B.V. v. Çukurova Holding A.Ş., 750 F.3d 221, 223 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam); Si-
mon v. Republic of Hungary, No. 10-1770 (BAH), 2014 WL 1873411, at *32 (D.D.C. May 
9, 2014); Alkanani v. Aegis Def. Servs., LLC, 976 F. Supp. 2d 13, 35 (D.D.C. 2014). But cf. 
Barriere v. Juluca, No. 12-23510-CIV, 2014 WL 652831, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2014) 
(finding general jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant). 
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can no longer be subject to general jurisdiction in this country, no matter what 
contacts they have with a particular state.  
Specific jurisdiction may still be available in cases arising out of the de-
fendant’s contacts with a given state. But a recent decision suggests that specif-
ic jurisdiction may not be able to fill the gaps left by the transformation of gen-
eral jurisdiction.64 In J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, the Court held 
that a New Jersey court lacked specific jurisdiction over a U.K. manufacturer 
whose shearing machine had mangled the hand of a New Jersey resident at 
work in New Jersey. The Court reasoned that the manufacturer did not “mani-
fest an intention to submit to” New Jersey’s power, even if it did target the U.S. 
market as a whole.65 This result has been widely criticized for denying U.S. 
plaintiffs the ability to sue foreign defendants in U.S. courts over injuries in the 
United States,66 and for encouraging foreign companies to avoid jurisdiction by 
structuring their business so as not to target individual states.67  
In one sense, Nicastro seems to be an exception to the retreat to territoriali-
ty because it rejects jurisdiction even over a suit relating to harms felt in the 
United States. But in another sense, it is territoriality on steroids, fetishizing the 
concept of a purposeful contact with a specific sovereign (and its territory) such 
that even harm in a particular territory is insufficient to support jurisdiction 
without accompanying targeted contacts with that sovereign.68  
Even if general jurisdiction is available in transnational suits against U.S. 
defendants and specific jurisdiction is available against foreigners, however, 
other avoidance doctrines, such as those discussed below, may nevertheless 
block the case from being heard in U.S. courts. 
2. Forum non conveniens 
As a matter of practice, forum non conveniens often excludes transnational 
cases involving foreign plaintiffs and foreign conduct from U.S. courts. This 
can afford U.S. defendants forum immunity in their home forum, creating ten-
sion with the principle that a defendant is subject to general jurisdiction where 
it is “at home.”  
 
 64. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, One Step Forward and Two Back: Missed Opportu-
nities in Refining the United States Minimum Contacts Test and the European Union Brus-
sels I Regulation, 31 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 4 (2014) (suggesting that general jurisdic-
tion had previously been a “partial antidote” to “gaps” in specific jurisdiction).  
 65. 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788, 2790 (2011) (plurality opinion).  
 66. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) establishes personal jurisdiction in federal 
court for suits over which no state has personal jurisdiction, but that applies only to suits that 
“arise[] under federal law.” 
 67. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2794-95 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Arthur R. Miller, 
McIntyre in Context: A Very Personal Perspective, 63 S.C. L. REV. 465, 475 (2012). 
 68. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (plurality opinion) (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction re-
quires a forum-by-forum, or sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis. . . . Because the United States 
is a distinct sovereign, a defendant may in principle be subject to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the United States but not of any particular State.”). 
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Forum non conveniens is a “federal common-law venue rule”69 that today, 
in the federal courts, applies only in transnational cases.70 Whereas personal 
jurisdiction has constitutional underpinnings, the forum non conveniens doc-
trine is based on the court’s “inherent power.”71 The Supreme Court crystal-
lized forum non conveniens in the mid-twentieth century,72 just as courts were 
rejecting territoriality.73 The doctrine articulates a multifactor balancing test for 
determining whether a court may decline to exercise jurisdiction if an alterna-
tive is available.74 The inquiry considers a number of public interest factors, 
which focus on judicial resources, and private interest factors, which focus on 
defendant burdens.75  
In the beginning, the Court emphasized that courts should “rarely” decline 
jurisdiction in these contexts.76 But, although the formal doctrine of forum non 
conveniens in the transnational context has changed little since 1981, its appli-
cation has morphed considerably. Over time, its use has snowballed into “the 
current most-suitable-forum version, under which the judge’s belief, for virtual-
ly any reason, that trial elsewhere would be more appropriate justifies a forum 
non conveniens dismissal.”77 This is true even though technology and transpor-
tation advances have reduced the inconvenience of litigating in a distant fo-
rum.78  
At several junctures, the Supreme Court has undermined the original pre-
sumption that forum non conveniens dismissals should be “rare.” Most signifi-
cantly, in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,79 the Court added four important fea-
 
 69. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994). 
 70. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2013), which authorizes transfers among federal district courts, 
has supplanted forum non conveniens in the domestic federal context. See Elizabeth T. Lear, 
Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on the Frontier of the 
Inherent Power, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1147, 1149 (2006). 
 71. See Lear, supra note 70, at 1207 (arguing that forum non conveniens is an uncon-
stitutional use of this power); Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation and In-
stitutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1100 (2010) (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 
501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991)). 
 72. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 502 (1947); Childress, supra 
note 3, at 165. 
 73. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 74. See Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508-09. 
 75. In Gulf Oil, the Court enumerated nonexclusive “public” and “private” interest fac-
tors to guide a court’s forum non conveniens decision. Public factors include court conges-
tion, imposition of jury duty, “having localized controversies decided at home,” and having a 
forum court that is at home with the law governing the case. Id. Private factors include “ease 
of access” to evidence and witnesses, “and all other practical problems that make trial of a 
case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Id. at 508. 
 76. Id. at 508; see David W. Robertson & Paula K. Speck, Access to State Courts in 
Transnational Personal Injury Cases: Forum Non Conveniens and Antisuit Injunctions, 68 
TEX. L. REV. 937, 940 (1990). 
 77. Robertson & Speck, supra note 76, at 940. 
 78. See Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access 
Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 784 n.12 (1985). 
 79. 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
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tures to the doctrine. First, and perhaps most importantly, it held that a foreign 
plaintiff should not enjoy the ordinary presumption of deference to the plain-
tiff’s choice of forum because there is less reason to assume the plaintiff chose 
the forum out of convenience.80 Second, it held that courts should not consider 
whether a plaintiff would confront less favorable law in the alternative forum, 
precisely because if that were the case, “dismissal would rarely be proper.”81 
Third, courts should only “rare[ly]” find an alternative forum to be unavaila-
ble.82 Fourth, and most subtly, the Court ignored (but did not dispute) the lower 
courts’ holdings that Pennsylvania law should apply, rejecting a previous un-
derstanding in most circuits that jurisdiction should be retained if American law 
applies.83 
In the Court’s most recent case addressing forum non conveniens, the 
Court approved of the practice of considering forum non conveniens even be-
fore determining whether a court has jurisdiction.84 Some scholars have specu-
lated that this development may increase rates of forum non conveniens dismis-
sals in federal courts.85  
Today, studies by Chris Whytock and Donald Childress suggest that feder-
al courts are more likely than not to grant forum non conveniens motions in 
cases involving foreign plaintiffs or foreign law.86 This result is “doctrinally 
unsurprising” given that Piper Aircraft strips foreigners of the typical deference 
that courts afford plaintiffs’ choice of forum.87 But forum non conveniens dis-
missals occur even in cases against American defendants.88 Without proper sta-
tistics on the amount of transnational litigation brought in the United States, it 
is admittedly difficult to determine the rate or cause of the increase in forum 
 
 80. Id. at 255-56. 
 81. Id. at 250. 
 82. Id. at 254 n.22. 
 83. See Robertson & Speck, supra note 76, at 941 n.22. 
 84. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 428-29 (2007); 
see Alan M. Trammell, Jurisdictional Sequencing, 47 GA. L. REV. 1099, 1109-10 (2013). 
 85. See Whytock, supra note 28, at 502, 503 & n.116.  
 86. Rates of dismissal under forum non conveniens hover around fifty percent. Chil-
dress, supra note 3, at 168-70 (citing statistics that put dismissal under these circumstances 
at around fifty percent and explaining why these statistics underreport dismissals); Christo-
pher A. Whytock, Politics and the Rule of Law in Transnational Judicial Governance: The 
Case of Forum Non Conveniens 16 (Feb. 28, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=969033. Those numbers go up, however, 
when foreign plaintiffs or foreign law are involved. Childress, supra note 72, at 169; 
Whytock, supra note 28, at 503. 
 87. Whytock, supra note 28, at 503. 
 88. See, e.g., Pollux Holding Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 329 F.3d 64, 67-68, 71, 
73-74 (2d Cir. 2003); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 480 (2d Cir. 2002); Can v. MD 
Helicopters, Inc., No. 1 CA-CV 10-0367, 2011 WL 1483783, at *1, *4 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 
19, 2011); Paulownia Plantations de Pan. Corp. v. Rajamannan, 793 N.W.2d 128, 130, 137-
39 (Minn. 2009). 
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non conveniens dismissals, but it is clear today that such dismissals over the 
past few decades are far from “rare.”89  
Such a robust forum non conveniens regime, protecting domestic defend-
ants from the inconvenience of litigation in cases brought by foreign plaintiffs, 
is unusual. Few other nations recognize forum non conveniens, and those that 
do tend to permit it more sparingly.90  
3. Abstention comity 
Courts cite international comity to explain much of what they do in trans-
national cases,91 but it is a term that has “many, too many, meanings.”92 The 
Supreme Court has described comity as “the recognition which one nation al-
lows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another 
nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the 
rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its 
laws.”93 In other words, it can mean practically anything or nothing. But it of-
ten describes a sort of intercourt diplomacy long assumed to be within courts’ 
constitutional competence. 
In one of its incarnations, comity is a freestanding doctrine that permits a 
court, in its discretion, “to decline to exercise jurisdiction in a case properly ad-
judicated in a foreign state.”94 It can be applied retrospectively, to abstain from 
 
 89. Cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947) (describing forum non 
conveniens as a doctrine that “should be applied” only in “rather rare cases”). 
 90. See, e.g., Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v Zhang (2002) 210 CLR 491 
(Austl.) (denying a motion to dismiss to an alternative forum in a case against foreign de-
fendants and applying foreign law where the tort occurred abroad and the only connection to 
the forum was the citizenship of the plaintiff); Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Life Receivables 
Ir. Ltd., [2008] 2 I.L.R.M. 460 (H. Ct.) (Ir.) (declining to dismiss a case against an Irish na-
tional even though proceedings between the same parties, dealing with the same issues, had 
previously been instituted in U.S. court); John JA Burke, Foreclosure of the Doctrine of Fo-
rum Non Conveniens Under the Brussels I Regulation: Advantages and Disadvantages, 
2008 EUR. LEGAL F. (E) I-121, I-122 to -123 (describing the U.K. doctrine of forum non 
conveniens); Christopher A. Whytock, Foreign State Immunity and the Right to Court Ac-
cess, 93 B.U. L. REV. 2033, 2052 n.111 (2013) (listing the few nations that do have a forum 
non conveniens doctrine).  
 91. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. 
L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=2558175.  
 92. United States v. Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (coining this oft-
quoted phrase, which applies to many legal concepts, with respect to the notoriously mallea-
ble term “jurisdiction”). 
 93. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895); see also ALEX MILLS, THE 
CONFLUENCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE, PLURALISM AND 
SUBSIDIARITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERING OF PRIVATE LAW 1-2 
(2009) (noting that comity represents private international law’s acknowledgement of its 
public international dimension). 
 94. Maxwell Commc’n Corp. v. Societe Generale (In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp.), 93 
F.3d 1036, 1047 (2d Cir. 1996); see, e.g., España v. ABSG Consulting, Inc., 334 F. App’x 
383, 384 (2d Cir. 2009); Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1237-38 
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hearing a case if a foreign court has already adjudicated a duplicative suit; pro-
spectively, to abstain from hearing a case that could be brought in a foreign 
court; or in parallel, to abstain from hearing a case brought while a duplicative 
suit is pending before a foreign court.95 In the latter two situations, some feder-
al courts consider whether “international comity,” or other values, such as fair-
ness and judicial economy, would counsel staying or dismissing the action.96  
Abstaining from hearing a case in the name of international comity in any 
of these postures, a practice I call “abstention comity,” occurs in circumstances 
that overlap with forum non conveniens. But the two doctrines are conceptually 
distinct. Comity allows “courts [to] abstain out of deference to the paramount 
interests of another sovereign,” whereas forum non conveniens reflects “a far 
broader range of considerations, most notably the convenience to the parties 
and the practical difficulties” of entertaining transnational cases.97 But the two 
can apply in the same or overlapping circumstances, such as the dismissal of 
parallel duplicative litigation. 
Abstention comity is thus an additional, discretionary way for courts to 
dismiss transnational cases, albeit a less popular one. Current default presump-
tions do not favor dismissal on abstention comity grounds.98 Some scholars ar-
gue, however, that courts should be more willing to stay or dismiss U.S. litiga-
tion brought after parallel suits have already been initiated in foreign fora.99  
4. Presumption against extraterritoriality  
One would be remiss to discuss transnational litigation avoidance without 
mentioning the statutory interpretation canon of the presumption against extra-
territoriality. Although it speaks to whether the plaintiff has a statutory cause of 
 
(11th Cir. 2004); Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61, 63 (S.D. Tex. 1994); see also 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797-98 (1993) (concluding that “interna-
tional comity would not counsel against exercising jurisdiction” in a case involving foreign 
conduct).  
 95. See Ungaro-Benages, 379 F.3d at 1238 (conceiving of comity as either retrospec-
tive or prospective and including parallel litigation as retrospective comity). 
 96. Linda Silberman, A Proposed Lis Pendens Rule for Courts in the United States: 
The International Judgments Projects of the American Law Institute, in INTERCONTINENTAL 
COOPERATION THROUGH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF PETER E. 
NYGH 341, 351 (Talia Einhorn & Kurt Siehr eds., 2004); see also Parrish, supra note 12, at 
243-44. 
 97. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 723 (1996) (citations omitted) 
(discussing the differences between forum non conveniens and domestic abstention doctrines 
based on comity among U.S. states). 
 98. See Parrish, supra note 12, at 242-43 (noting reasons why duplicative litigation 
proceeds “unhindered”). Also, unlike forum non conveniens, the Supreme Court has never 
directly addressed the issue of abstention comity in the context of duplicative international 
litigation. Id. at 241. 
 99. See, e.g., id. at 243-44; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Forum Shopping, Antisuit Injunc-
tions, Negative Declarations, and Related Tools of International Litigation, 91 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 314, 318 (1997). 
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action under federal law,100 a question of prescriptive rather than adjudicatory 
jurisdiction, the presumption is another means of avoiding transnational litiga-
tion in U.S. courts. Especially in light of recent opinions strengthening the can-
on, it can cause both U.S. plaintiffs to lose a forum in which to sue and U.S. de-
fendants to obtain home-forum immunity for conduct committed abroad. 
In the early twentieth century, courts presumed that Congress did not in-
tend to regulate extraterritorial conduct.101 By the late 1980s, however, that 
presumption had all but been given up for dead.102 In areas as diverse as anti-
trust, trademark, securities fraud, and human rights, courts instead used interna-
tional law methods of interpreting the extraterritorial reach of laws on a case-
by-case basis, considering “connecting factors” between the case and the forum 
and conflicts among national laws.103  
Resuscitating the doctrine in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Ar-
amco),104 the Court announced what seemed to be a clear statement rule requir-
ing Congress to specify that it intended a statute to apply extraterritorially for 
the Court to interpret it that way.105 But even after Aramco, some areas of the 
law, including securities fraud and human rights litigation, continued to appear 
immune from the presumption.106  
In two recent cases involving foreign plaintiffs, foreign defendants, and 
foreign conduct (known as “foreign-cubed” cases107), however, the Court so-
lidified its retreat to territoriality. First, in Morrison v. National Australia Bank 
Ltd., 108 the Court rejected the Second Circuit’s longstanding precedent and 
held that the anti-extraterritoriality presumption did apply to securities fraud 
 
100. The Supreme Court recently clarified that the extraterritorial reach of a statute 
raises a merits question, not a question of subject matter jurisdiction, as it had long been un-
derstood. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 253-54 (2010). 
101. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909). 
102. See William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 
16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 85-86 (1998). 
103. Born, supra note 38, at 44-45. 
104. 499 U.S. 244 (1991). 
105. Id. at 248. The Court applied this rule even in the face of compelling evidence that 
Congress had intended for the relevant statute to apply abroad. See id. at 266-71 (Marshall, 
J., dissenting). Indeed, shortly after the decision, Congress amended the statute to overturn 
Aramco’s interpretation. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 
1071, 1077. 
106. For decades, in areas including antitrust, securities fraud, RICO, federal criminal 
law, and international human rights litigation, the presumption was traditionally not applied. 
See Pamela K. Bookman, Note, Solving the Extraterritoriality Problem: Lessons from the 
Honest Services Statute, 92 VA. L. REV. 749, 758 (2006) (citing CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK 
L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 528 (2003)). 
107. Eugene Kontorovich, Kiobel Surprise: Unexpected by Scholars but Consistent 
with International Trends, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1671, 1689-90 (2014) (defining “for-
eign-cubed”). 
108. 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
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actions.109 This shift foreclosed a large amount of transnational litigation that 
had formerly been taken for granted, including suits by U.S. plaintiffs.110  
Three years later, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,111 the Court 
applied the presumption in a case in which the plaintiffs asserted jurisdiction 
under the Alien Tort Statute,112 removing any doubt that the reinvigoration of 
the extraterritoriality doctrine announced in Morrison applied far beyond the 
securities context.113 Lower courts are taking the directive seriously, applying 
the doctrine to other areas long thought to defeat the presumption, including 
RICO and federal criminal law.114 After Morrison and Kiobel, the canon fore-
closes litigation in a variety of subject matter areas—brought against U.S. de-
fendants, by U.S. plaintiffs, and even by the U.S. government—that had long 
escaped the Aramco presumption.115  
B. Stated Goals 
To understand whether avoidance decisions have succeeded and whether 
the resulting litigation isolationism is a worthy pursuit, one must look at what 
the doctrines are trying to achieve. Scholars studying U.S. courts’ increasing 
hostility to litigation more generally have noted that the Supreme Court Justices 
justify those developments as reactions to the perceived ills of the U.S. judicial 
system: the threat of abuse, the expense of litigation, and the possibility of ex-
 
109. See id. at 257, 261. 
110. See, e.g., Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Automobil Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 
470-71 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). But cf. Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 
F.3d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (discussing facts that could support a complaint by U.S. plaintiffs 
based on trading on a foreign exchange). 
111. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
112. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2013). 
113. See Anthony J. Colangelo, Kiobel: Muddling the Distinction Between Prescriptive 
and Adjudicative Jurisdiction, 28 MD. J. INT’L L. 65, 66 (2013). 
114. See, e.g., Liu Meng-Lin v. Siemens AG, 763 F.3d 175, 176-81 (2d Cir. 2014) (ap-
plying Morrison to the Dodd-Frank Act antiretaliation provision); United States v. Vilar, 729 
F.3d 62, 72-74 (2d Cir. 2013) (applying Morrison to criminal securities cases, contrary to the 
prior understanding that federal criminal laws were exempt from the anti-extraterritoriality 
presumption per United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922)); Norex Petrol. Ltd. v. Access 
Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 30-31 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (applying Morrison to RICO 
claims). But cf., e.g., European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 764 F.3d 129, 135-36 (2d 
Cir. 2014) (limiting Norex); United States v. Lawrence, 727 F.3d 386, 392 & n.2 (5th Cir. 
2013) (declining to extend Kiobel’s reasoning to apply to 21 U.S.C. § 959(b)).  
115. See, e.g., City of Pontiac Policemen’s & Firemen’s Ret. Sys. v. UBS AG, 752 F.3d 
173, 176 (2d Cir. 2014) (applying Morrison to bar a suit concerning securities offered by a 
foreign defendant and purchased by a domestic plaintiff in a foreign transaction, even though 
those securities were cross-listed on a domestic exchange); Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 
F.3d 174, 179-80, 182 (2d Cir. 2013) (applying Kiobel to suits against U.S. defendants); 
John C. Coffee, Jr., What Hath ‘Morrison’ Wrought, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 16, 2010, at 5 (“[Morri-
son] denies American investors the ability to sue an American corporation when the pur-
chase or sale transaction occurs offshore.”). 
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torted settlements.116 This Subpart focuses on what courts say motivates trans-
national litigation avoidance. 
While these doctrinal developments may not form a single, concerted ef-
fort, courts appear to articulate three common values supporting the return to 
territoriality in these different doctrinal contexts. First, transnational litigation 
implicates separation of powers concerns because it involves federal courts ad-
judicating cases that touch on foreign affairs, which should be the province of 
the political branches. 117  Second, and relatedly, transnational litigation is 
sometimes believed to endanger international comity by offending foreign na-
tions or infringing on their regulatory authority.118 Third, courts and commen-
tators contend that transnational litigation, particularly in U.S. courts, is espe-
cially cumbersome for defendants, whether they are foreigners litigating far 
from home119 or local defendants embroiled in disputes arising overseas.120 
This focus on defendants is descriptive rather than normative; as discussed be-
low, the doctrines focus on defendants’ interests far more than plaintiffs’. 
1. Separation of powers 
Transnational litigation implicates complicated separation of powers issues 
because all three branches of the federal government have constitutional roles 
to play in defining jurisdiction itself: courts define court access rules and inter-
pret statutes, Congress establishes courts’ jurisdiction, and the executive branch 
dominates foreign relations, including treaty negotiations over matters of pri-
vate international law.121 But their interests and agendas may not always align.  
Scholars and courts agree that transnational litigation implicates separation 
of powers concerns because such litigation can impact foreign affairs.122 This 
concern is separate from courts’ desire to promote international comity. It is, 
instead, a concern about courts’ inferior competence and constitutional authori-
 
116. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 67, at 477. 
117. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 457, 466-67 (2001).  
118. See infra note 141. 
119. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987).  
120. See, e.g., Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 2002). 
121. Cf., e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 
86 VA. L. REV. 1127 (2000) (distinguishing between “separation of functions” and the “bal-
ance of power” among the branches); Ryan M. Scoville, Legislative Diplomacy, 112 MICH. 
L. REV. 331 (2013) (analyzing Congress’s role in foreign affairs). 
122. See, e.g., Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 542-43 (5th Cir. 1997); 
Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 1, 11 (1987); Stephen B. Burbank, The World in Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. REV. 
1456, 1498 (1991) (reviewing GARY B. BORN WITH DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL 
LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS (1989)). 
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ty to make foreign affairs judgments and deference to the political branches’ 
foreign affairs role.123 
U.S. courts’ treatment of foreign parties, whether they appear as plaintiffs 
or defendants, can trigger foreign relations concerns. When foreign defendants 
have been sued in U.S. courts, for example, foreign sovereigns have filed ami-
cus briefs or even enacted retaliatory clawback statutes, enabling their nationals 
to recoup damages won in U.S. courts that would not have been available in 
their home courts.124 Expansive concepts of general jurisdiction over foreign-
ers can impose barriers to trade and foreign direct investment that may conflict 
with executive branch policies.125  
Not entertaining such cases can also irk foreign nations. In response to U.S. 
courts dismissing cases brought by foreign plaintiffs on forum non conveniens 
grounds, some countries have enacted blocking statutes specifically designed to 
render their courts unavailable to cases dismissed from U.S. courts on this ba-
sis.126 For example, Guatemala passed a law that a case refiled in Guatemala 
following a forum non conveniens dismissal is not a product of the plaintiff’s 
free will and, therefore, will not generate jurisdiction in Guatemalan courts.127  
Situations like these raise sensitive foreign relations issues best addressed 
by the political branches. But they arise in the context of disputes among pri-
vate parties that are considered the bread and butter of the judicial function.128  
In the 1980s, the Court responded to this tension by adopting a reasonable-
ness analysis, 129  in part out of respect for separation of powers. Justice 
O’Connor noted that the “Federal Government’s interest in its foreign relations 
policies” in every case “will be best served by a careful inquiry into the reason-
ableness of the assertion of jurisdiction in the particular case, and an unwilling-
ness to find the serious burdens on an alien defendant outweighed by minimal 
 
123. These concerns also animate the political question doctrine, although that doctrine 
does not bar “every case or controversy which touches foreign relations.” Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186, 211 (1962). Indeed, in a recent case addressing the political question doctrine, 
these concerns did not stay the Supreme Court’s hand. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. 
Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1424-25 (2012). 
124. See Bermann, supra note 17, at 32-33. 
125. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Helicopteros Nacionales de Co-
lom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (No. 82-1127), 1983 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 201, 
at *10; HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 144-
45 (2008). 
126. Henry Saint Dahl, Forum Non Conveniens, Latin America and Blocking Statutes, 
35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 21, 21 (2004). 
127. Id. at 24 (describing the Guatemalan law and other countries’ similar efforts). 
128. The problem is even more acute when governments or government-owned entities 
are involved. See, e.g., Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 
U.S. 522, 558 & n.14 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (dis-
cussing foreign countries’ diplomatic protests in response to federal courts’ failure to apply 
the Hague Evidence Convention); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 409-
10 (1964) (discussing foreign relations issues related to recognizing a Cuban government 
instrumentality as a plaintiff).  
129. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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interests on the part of the plaintiff or the forum State.”130 But the more recent 
avoidance developments have instead excluded categories of transnational liti-
gation altogether in the name of similar interests. For example, in Daimler, the 
Court justified its holding in part based on the Solicitor General’s warning that 
“foreign governments’ objections to some domestic courts’ expansive views of 
general jurisdiction have . . . impeded [the executive branch’s] negotiations of 
international agreements on the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of 
judgments.”131  
The Court has likewise justified the anti-extraterritoriality presumption as a 
way of preventing judicial interference with the “delicate field of international 
relations.”132 Had Congress intended that a statute apply overseas, the Court 
reasoned, “it would have addressed the subject of conflicts with foreign laws 
and procedures.”133 A clear statement is required before courts will apply a 
statute to conduct abroad because Congress “alone has the facilities necessary 
to make fairly such an important policy decision where the possibilities of in-
ternational discord are so evident and retaliative action so certain.”134 While 
there are several possible reasons for the presumption,135 one of the most com-
pelling is that when interpreting statutes, courts should not risk offending for-
eign sovereigns absent evidence that Congress “really wants” to do so.136  
The Supreme Court has not yet justified forum non conveniens on separa-
tion of powers grounds.137 Commentators, however, have noted that forum non 
conveniens permits courts to dismiss transnational cases without embroiling 
themselves in contentious international disputes between sovereigns.138  
 
130. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987); see also KOH, 
supra note 125, at 146. 
131. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014) (quoting Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746 (No. 11-965), 
2013 WL 3377321) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727-28 (2004). 
132. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (quoting Benz v. 
Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957)). 
133. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 269 (2010) (quoting EEOC v. 
Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 256 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
134. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (quoting Benz, 353 U.S. at 147) (internal quotation mark 
omitted). 
135. Dodge, supra note 102, at 112-13 (identifying “six possible reasons for the pre-
sumption”). 
136. Franklin A. Gevurtz, Determining Extraterritoriality, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
341, 378 (2014) (arguing that this international relations rationale is the presumption’s only 
useful purpose). 
137. See Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the Proposed Hague Con-
vention and Progress in National Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 203, 244 (2001). 
138. See, e.g., John Byron Sandage, Note, Forum Non Conveniens and the Extraterrito-
rial Application of United States Antitrust Law, 94 YALE L.J. 1693, 1694 (1985); cf. Lear, 
supra note 70, at 1152 (arguing that forum non conveniens is “an unconstitutional usurpation 
of congressional power”). 
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Finally, international comity is, of course, the primary concern driving ab-
stention comity. But the idea has separation of powers underpinnings.139 Like 
efforts to comply with international law itself, judicial efforts in the name of 
international comity seek to eliminate international discord to further perceived 
executive prerogatives.140  
2. International comity 
As just noted, the separation of powers and international comity concerns 
underlying avoidance are intertwined: When courts unilaterally interfere with 
foreign affairs in ways that may upset international comity, they can offend 
separation of powers. Indeed, courts’ very evaluation of comity can be in ten-
sion with separation of powers principles.  
Courts and commentators often cite international comity independently as 
a justification for avoidance doctrines.141 What courts mean by this is not al-
ways clear or consistent. But the concept appears to be one over which judges 
have discretion142 and that takes the place of reliance on international law.143  
Abstention comity of course reflects notions of comity, but recent deci-
sions about personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, and extraterritoriality 
also invoke this value. In Daimler, the Court relied directly on comity to justify 
its definition of general jurisdiction. Justice Ginsburg highlighted the “risks to 
international comity” created by a too-expansive view of general jurisdiction, 
noting that “[o]ther nations do not share” such an approach, that other nations’ 
objections to such an approach have impeded negotiations of international 
agreements, and that the approach “could discourage foreign investors” and 
 
139. Cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (“The act of 
state doctrine . . . expresses the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the 
task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder rather than further this 
country’s pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the 
international sphere.”). 
140. See Roger P. Alford, Foreign Relations as a Matter of Interpretation: The Use and 
Abuse of Charming Betsy, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1339, 1344 (2006). 
141. See, e.g., Born, supra note 122, at 29; Merritt B. Fox, Securities Class Actions 
Against Foreign Issuers, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1173, 1271 (2012); Austen L. Parrish, Sovereign-
ty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1, 55 (2006); Linda J. Silberman, Developments in Jurisdiction and Forum 
Non Conveniens in International Litigation: Thoughts on Reform and a Proposal for a Uni-
form Standard, 28 TEX. INT’L L.J. 501, 526 (1993). But cf. Elizabeth T. Lear, National Inter-
ests, Foreign Injuries, and Federal Forum Non Conveniens, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 559, 563 
(2007) (arguing that “routinely dismissing foreign claims against American multinationals” 
raises comity concerns, but exercising jurisdiction does not). As noted, courts sometimes use 
international comity as an independent ground for dismissing a case. See supra Part I.A.3. 
142. See Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 589 (9th Cir. 2014) (reviewing the dis-
trict court’s international comity decision for abuse of discretion). 
143. In earlier eras, courts tended to rely more directly on international or natural law 
principles. See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953) (relying on international 
law); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 730, 735 (1878) (citing natural law). 
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“has led to ‘international friction.’”144 This one paragraph incorporates several 
values—appreciating international practice, facilitating the executive branch’s 
ability to negotiate treaties, encouraging foreign investment, and preventing 
“international friction.”  
Courts have also justified forum non conveniens on comity grounds, dis-
missing cases on this basis in deference to other nations’ interests in the 
case.145 Some commentators agree that comity informs forum non conveni-
ens.146 Others, however, have questioned whether forum non conveniens is 
consistent with comity. Adrian Briggs argues that suggesting that a case (over 
which a U.S. judge otherwise has jurisdiction) should be transferred to a for-
eign judge, “almost whether he likes it or not,” hardly reflects notions of comi-
ty.147 Latin American “blocking statutes,” enacted in response to the presump-
tion against entertaining cases brought by foreign plaintiffs, suggest that forum 
non conveniens dismissals indeed create some international discord.148 Some 
judges have argued that comity is best served by rejecting the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens altogether.149  
The presumption against extraterritoriality likewise “serves to protect 
against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which 
could result in international discord.”150 But in Morrison, the Court muddied 
the intersection of international discord, comity, and customary international 
law. The Court noted the Solicitor General’s point that the Second Circuit’s ap-
proach to determining the extraterritorial reach of the securities laws151 accord-
ed with “prevailing notions of international comity,” but concluded that, even if 
that approach “would not violate customary international law,” that fact would 
 
144. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014) (quoting Brief for the Re-
spondents at 35, Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746 (No. 11-965), 2013 WL 4495139). 
145. See, e.g., Figueiredo Ferraz E Engenharia de Projeto Ltda. v. Republic of Peru, 665 
F.3d 384, 392 (2d Cir. 2011); see also Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 467 
(1994) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he forum non conveniens defense promotes comity and 
trade.”). Contra Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 723 (1996) (distinguishing 
comity and forum non conveniens). 
146. See, e.g., N. Jansen Calamita, Rethinking Comity: Towards a Coherent Treatment 
of International Parallel Proceedings, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 601, 640 (2006). 
147. Adrian Briggs, The Principle of Comity in Private International Law, 354 RECUEIL 
DES COURS 65, 119-21 (2011) (arguing that forum non conveniens is inconsistent with comi-
ty because it “tell[s] the foreign court what it ought to do”). 
148. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
149. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 687 (Tex. 1990) 
(Doggett, J., concurring) (“Comity is not achieved when the United States allows its multina-
tional corporations to adhere to a double standard when operating abroad and subsequently 
refuses to hold them accountable for those actions.”). 
150. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
151. The Second Circuit had permitted such reach “when there was ‘significant U.S. 
fraudulent conduct that directly caused the plaintiffs losses’ (the conduct test) or when there 
were ‘significant effects’ on the U.S. securities markets (the effects test).” Linda J. 
Silberman, Morrison v. National Australia Bank: Implications for Global Securities Actions, 
12 Y.B. PRIV. INT’L L. 123, 124 (2010). 
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not prove that Congress had intended to instantiate it.152 This discussion seems 
to equate international comity with customary international law but then rejects 
reliance on either, leaving the reader guessing as to whether comity remains as 
a valid interest, and if so, what it means. 
Other opinions, however, continue to assert comity’s importance to the ex-
traterritoriality canon. Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Kiobel refers to the “no-
tions of comity that lead each nation to respect the sovereign rights of other na-
tions by limiting the reach of its own laws and their enforcement,”153 as well as 
citing comity as a “[f]urther limiting principle[]” that would reinforce his pro-
posed approach to determining jurisdiction over Alien Tort Statute cases.154 
These references appear to refer to two concepts: limitations on the extraterrito-
rial reach of U.S. laws and abstention comity.  
The varied uses of international comity raise serious questions about comi-
ty’s role in avoidance doctrines, and what the term means and should mean. 
Whereas the rejection of territoriality in the late twentieth century often relied 
on international law,155 recent cases returning to territoriality instead invoke 
“international comity” as an amorphous concept that often refers to foreign na-
tions’ opinions or the possibility for regulatory conflict, but that affords little 
consistent instructive value.  
3. Defendants’ convenience 
Finally, uniting most of the recent avoidance decisions appears to be a 
common concern that transnational litigation burdens defendants with tremen-
dous inconvenience.156 These concerns are expressed with respect to both for-
eign and domestic defendants. 
In the personal jurisdiction context, as Ben Spencer and others have noted, 
it must be that the due process interests the Court discusses157 also include con-
sideration of convenience.158 “[C]onstitutionally significant” inconvenience, as 
 
152. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 272 (2010). 
153. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1671 (2013) (Breyer, J., con-
curring in the judgment). 
154. Id. at 1674. 
155. See Born, supra note 38, at 1. 
156. Forum non conveniens and arguably the anti-extraterritoriality presumption are al-
so concerned with judicial efficiency. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 
(1947) (forum non conveniens); Morrison, 561 U.S. at 270 (anti-extraterritoriality presump-
tion). 
157. See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014). 
158. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 617, 627 (2006) (“The Court has clearly made inconvenience to defendants a 
central concern of the Due Process Clause within the doctrine of personal jurisdiction.”); 
Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Eval-
uation, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1112, 1133 (1981); Alan M. Trammell & Derek E. Bambauer, 
Personal Jurisdiction and the “Interwebs,” 100 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming July 2015) 
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Justice Brennan called it, could violate due process in cases of extreme incon-
venience—for example, if “witnesses or evidence or the defendant himself 
were immobile.”159  
Forum non conveniens protects defendants from inconvenience of a more 
mundane sort. Courts justify forum non conveniens as based on fairness and 
judicial economy as well,160 but, of the private concerns, defendants’ conven-
ience dominates.161 And if the personal jurisdiction inquiry addresses issues of 
unconstitutional inconvenience, then forum non conveniens must provide a 
means for dismissing suits based on some lesser convenience standard.  
Courts applying forum non conveniens, moreover, can conclude that a fo-
rum is inconvenient even where the defendant is a U.S. citizen sued in his home 
forum.162 Such reasoning goes against traditional assumptions that the most 
fair and convenient place to sue a defendant is in his home forum163 and that 
home fora are most likely to afford preferential or at least nonprejudicial treat-
ment.164 The presumption that defendants may be sued in their home fora is 
widely recognized internationally165 and also creates a simple and logical start-
ing point for plaintiffs’ forum selection choices. Indeed, the Court may have 
adopted the “at home” rule for general jurisdiction in Goodyear and Daimler in 
part for these reasons.166 Defendants’ home fora also often have a significant 
sovereign interest over a suit, even if the underlying conduct occurred else-
 
(manuscript at 11), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2494969. 
159. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 301 (1980) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). 
160. See, e.g., Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 432 
(2007); see also id. at 435 (noting that Sinochem was “a textbook case for immediate forum 
non conveniens dismissal” because personal jurisdiction discovery “would have burdened 
Sinochem with expense and delay”). 
161. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno discounts any convenience considerations that might 
have caused a foreign plaintiff to choose a U.S. forum, leaving defendants’ convenience to 
be the primary private interest factor. See 454 U.S. 235, 255-56 (1981).  
162. See, e.g., id. at 239-40, 243, 261 (approving of forum non conveniens dismissal of 
a suit against a Pennsylvania defendant in Pennsylvania federal court after the court deter-
mined that Pennsylvania law would apply); supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
163. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 255-56 (“[I]t is reasonable to assume that [a 
home forum] is convenient.”); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) 
(framing the due process question as estimating inconveniences created by subjecting a de-
fendant to suit away from home); Michael P. Verna, Convenience Has Nothing to Do with 
FNC Motions, 22 AIR & SPACE LAW., no. 4, 2008, at 9, 10 (mocking claims that a home fo-
rum is “inconvenient”). But cf. Pollux Holding Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 329 F.3d 64, 
74 (2d Cir. 2003) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument for a per se rule favoring litigation in the 
defendant’s home forum). 
164. Whether this assumption continues to hold true may be a question for further in-
quiry. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1120, 1122 (1996). 
165. See supra note 56. 
166. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014) (noting that Europe has 
domicile-based general jurisdiction). 
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where, because of the sovereign’s interest in regulating the conduct of its own 
nationals and residents.167  
Like personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens, the anti-extraterrito-
riality presumption is in part intended to protect defendants from the burdens of 
transnational litigation. In Morrison, for example, the Court rejected the Solici-
tor General’s proposed test for recognizing securities fraud actions because 
such a standard would attract litigation over fraud in foreign securities mar-
kets.168 Such worries about large amounts of litigation reflect concerns for de-
fendant inconvenience as well as judicial economy.169 
Finally, abstention comity is informed not only by fairness and conser-
vation of judicial resources, 170 but also by “international duty and conven-
ience.”171  
By contrast, the avoidance decisions seem almost entirely unconcerned 
with plaintiffs’ interests, even if the plaintiffs are American, as in Goodyear.172 
Scholars have criticized avoidance decisions for cutting off access to justice.173 
The rhetoric of defendant convenience often goes hand in hand with con-
cerns about judicial convenience and conservation of judicial resources.174 But 
when it does not overlap with considerations of judicial inconvenience, defend-
ant inconvenience should not get so much attention. One possibility for why it 
does is that the focus on defendants’ interests is a proxy for related concerns 
about protecting perceived economic interests.175 For example, scholars have 
criticized transnational litigation, particularly in the human rights context, for 
discouraging foreign investment in the United States.176 Alan Sykes and others 
 
167. See Lear, supra note 141, at 562.  
168. 561 U.S. 247, 270 (2010) (“[S]ome fear that [the United States] has become the 
Shangri-La of class-action litigation for lawyers representing those allegedly cheated in for-
eign securities markets.”). 
169. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-59 (2007) (expressing similar 
concern about defendants’ inconvenience stemming from the expenses of litigation). 
170. See Turner Entm’t Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1522 (11th Cir. 
1994). 
171. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895). 
172. Dissenting in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, Justice Ginsburg expressed 
dismay that the Court’s judgment “puts United States plaintiffs at a disadvantage in compari-
son to similarly situated complainants elsewhere in the world,” who would likely be able to 
bring suit in the place where the harmful event occurred. 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2803-04 (2011) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
173. See Whytock & Robertson, supra note 10, at 1450. 
174. See, e.g., supra notes 21, 75 and accompanying text. 
175. This theory is consistent with the belief that the Supreme Court is generally busi-
ness friendly, which often translates as defendant friendly. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Closing the Courthouse Doors, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 317, 319 (2012) (arguing that the Rob-
erts Court is “pro-business”). But see Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in the Supreme 
Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1471 (2013) (arguing that businesses “fare[] worse . . . than 
their nonbusiness opponents”). 
176. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 46, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. 
Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491), 2012 WL 259389; Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, Lex 
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have argued that because doing business in the United States makes companies 
subject to personal jurisdiction here, doing business in the United States sub-
jects companies to a litigation tax inapplicable to companies that do no business 
here.177 Indeed, the Court in Daimler cited this concern as further justification 
for its ruling.178 But, although Goodyear and Daimler’s transformation of gen-
eral jurisdiction significantly reduced any such litigation tax on foreign corpo-
rations, it exacerbated the effects for U.S. companies, and potentially discour-
ages companies from incorporating or headquartering in the United States. In 
other words, for this and other reasons (discussed in Part III), defendant con-
venience is a poor proxy for U.S. economic interests and indeed undermines 
other U.S. interests. 
II. FOREIGN DEVELOPMENTS 
The expansion of avoidance doctrines is largely a story about federal law 
and federal courts, and it has led scholars to predict that certain types of federal 
court litigation will now be brought under state law and at least sometimes in 
state court.179 This may be true to some extent. But there are constitutional lim-
its on personal jurisdiction in state and federal court. Forum non conveniens of-
ten exists in state law substantially in parallel to the federal doctrine.180 And 
for the anti-extraterritoriality presumption and abstention comity, not only are 
there state law equivalents,181 but the full reach of foreign affairs preemption 
has not  
yet been tested.182 Aside from state courts, the alternative available fora are ei-
ther non-U.S. tribunals or, as has long been assumed, no court at all.183 
 
Loci Delictus and Global Economic Welfare: Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 1137, 1146 (2007); Sykes, supra note 44, at 340-41. 
177. See, e.g., Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 176, at 1146 (warning that tort liability in 
U.S. courts can place U.S. firms at a competitive disadvantage). But see Miller, supra note 
67, at 469 (arguing that “litigation tax” fears are based on “[b]ogus statistics”). 
178. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014). 
179. See, e.g., Childress, supra note 11, at 739; Katherine Florey, State Law, U.S. Pow-
er, Foreign Disputes: Understanding the Extraterritorial Effects of State Law in the Wake of 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 92 B.U. L. REV. 535, 539 (2012) (“Morrison has the 
perverse effect of substituting state law for federal law in securities cases involving substan-
tial foreign contacts.”). 
180. See Robertson & Speck, supra note 76, at 950-51 (noting differences among state 
approaches to forum non conveniens, but with few states rejecting the doctrine); see also, 
e.g., Kedy v. A.W. Chesterton Co. (In re Asbestos Litig.), 946 A.2d 1171, 1175 (R.I. 2008). 
181. See, e.g., Global Reinsurance Corp. v. Equitas Ltd., 969 N.E.2d 187, 195 (N.Y. 
2012) (applying New York State’s presumption against extraterritoriality to New York anti-
trust laws); Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. Indus. Risk Insurers, 775 A.2d 601, 603 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (affirming dismissal on international comity grounds). 
182. See, e.g., Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 670 F.3d 1067, 1072, 1077 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (finding that the state statute of limitations was preempted by the dormant foreign 
affairs preemption); Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 
964-66 (9th Cir. 2010) (same); Roger P. Alford, Human Rights After Kiobel: Choice of Law 
and the Rise of Transnational Tort Litigation, 63 EMORY L.J. 1158, 1159-60 (2014); Harlan 
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Recent developments in foreign courts have undermined the conventional 
wisdom that transnational litigation has no other place to go.184 Political sci-
ence scholars in particular have begun to document the adoption of many 
American-style procedures in foreign courts.185 The absence of transnational 
tort litigation in U.S. courts, it turns out, may not signify its absence from do-
mestic courts worldwide.  
These developments are surprising to many186 and disputed by some.187 
Foreign opinion has long looked down on American “adversarial legalism”—
our system of “policymaking, policy implementation, and dispute resolution by 
means of lawyer-dominated litigation”188—and foreign countries were not ex-
pected to adopt it. Europe, for example, was thought to have extensive regula-
tion but limited civil litigation enforcement, whereas the United States, while 
still active in the regulatory arena, relied more heavily on civil litigation to en-
force its laws.189  
In fact, many nations have begun to recognize higher damages awards, ag-
gregate litigation procedures, and third-party litigation funding. This Part 
brings together scholarship and primary evidence of these emerging trends with 
 
G. Cohen, Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the Roberts Court, 83 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 380, 396-97 (2015). 
183. See Axel Halfmeier, Transnationale Delikte vor nationalen Gerichten oder: Wie 
weiter nach dem Ende der amerikanischen Rechtshegemonie?, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ULRICH 
MAGNUS 433, 439 (Peter Mankowski & Wolfgang Wurmnest eds., 2014) (suggesting avoid-
ance decisions could result in a potential regulatory vacuum); Whytock & Robertson, supra 
note 10, at 1448 n.18 (“Historically, plaintiffs generally did not refile their suits in foreign 
courts following forum non conveniens dismissals; instead, they tended to settle on terms 
favorable to the defendants or abandon their suits altogether.”). 
184. See Marcus S. Quintanilla & Christopher A. Whytock, The New Multipolarity in 
Transnational Litigation: Foreign Courts, Foreign Judgments, and Foreign Law, 18 SW. J. 
INT’L LAW 31, 33 (2011); infra Part II.A. But cf., e.g., Gonzalez v. Chrysler Corp., 301 F.3d 
377, 382-83 (5th Cir. 2002) (dismissing the case on forum non conveniens grounds despite 
the parties’ and court’s agreement that the case was not financially viable in an alternative 
forum). Developments in other kinds of tribunals also offer possible alternative fora, but are 
beyond the scope of this Article. See supra note 11. 
185. See, e.g., R. DANIEL KELEMEN, EUROLEGALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW 
AND REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 7-8 (2011). 
186. See id. at 9.  
187. Some scholars disagree that American and foreign procedures are converging to-
ward an American model. See, e.g., Francesca Bignami, Cooperative Legalism and the Non-
Americanization of European Regulatory Styles: The Case of Data Privacy, 59 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 411 (2011) (finding convergence of regulatory styles, not litigation); Robert A. Kagan, 
Should Europe Worry About Adversarial Legalism?, 17 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 165-66 
(1997) (arguing that procedures are not converging). For purposes of this Article, I rest on 
the research and analysis of Kelemen and others who have convincingly demonstrated the 
growing influence of “Eurolegalism,” Kelemen’s term for the emerging European variant of 
Robert Kagan’s “adversarial legalism,” KELEMEN, supra note 185, at 7-8, and similar trends 
around the world. 
188. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 3 
(2001).  
189. KELEMEN, supra note 185, at 7. 
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analysis of substantive foreign law and foreign courts’ adjudicative jurisdiction 
rules. Together, I argue, these developments signal the growing potential of 
foreign courts to attract transnational litigation. As illustrations of these phe-
nomena, this Article draws heavily on the experiences of Europe and Canada, 
some of the United States’ largest trading partners,190 and, along with Austral-
ia, home to the foreign entities involved in prominent recent avoidance cas-
es.191 These are some of the best, but far from the only, examples.192 
A. The Developments 
Three major developments signal foreign courts’ growing attractiveness to 
transnational litigants: the increasing availability of higher damages awards, 
aggregate litigation, and alternative litigation funding arrangements. These fea-
tures are evolving against a backdrop where the United States may no longer 
have the substantive law with the strictest liability standards or with the greatest 
extraterritorial reach, and foreign courts have relatively permissive rules of ad-
judicatory jurisdiction. The result, as discussed in the next Subpart, will be a 
legal landscape with increasingly diverse forum choices for plaintiffs.  
First, damages awards abroad are not yet reaching (and may never reach) 
U.S.-style levels, but they are growing and will likely continue to grow.193 The 
most infamous examples are the Nicaraguan DBCP judgments described in the 
Introduction and the $18 billion Ecuadorian judgment against Chevron (after 
the cases were dismissed from U.S. courts on forum non conveniens 
grounds).194 But there are many less notorious examples,195 especially in cer-
 
190. See Top Trading Partners—December 2012, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www 
.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1212yr.html#2012 (last visited Apr. 28, 
2015). 
191. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 750-51 (2014) (German defendant); 
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 251 (2010) (Australian defendant); see 
also, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 248 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (Canadian defendant). 
192. Foreign courts growing increasingly attractive to transnational litigants does not 
mean that these courts are adopting policies of universal jurisdiction. Cf. Donovan & Rob-
erts, supra note 43, at 142 (discussing the emergence of civil universal jurisdiction). But the 
more nations that make their courts attractive to litigation generally and transnational litiga-
tion in particular, the more options there are for plaintiffs to sue outside the United States, 
particularly when a U.S. forum appears foreclosed. 
193. See KELEMEN, supra note 185, at 74; Mark A. Behrens et al., Global Litigation 
Trends, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 165, 192-93 (2009). 
194. See Manuel A. Gómez, The Global Chase: Seeking the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of the Lago Agrio Judgment Outside of Ecuador, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 429, 430, 
432 (2013). 
195. See, e.g., Ohno v. Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984, 986-87 (9th Cir. 2013) (enforcing a $1.2 
million tort judgment from a Japanese court); DeJoria v. Maghreb Petrol. Exploration S.A., 
38 F. Supp. 3d 805, 807 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (refusing to enforce a $122.9 million Moroccan 
judgment). 
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tain areas, such as antitrust196 and global securities fraud class actions, which 
have yielded settlements of hundreds of millions of dollars.197  
Even punitive damages appear to be gaining legitimacy.198 National courts 
in Europe, Canada, and Thailand have recently permitted punitive damages or 
recognized punitive damages awards from other countries.199 In 2012, for ex-
ample, the U.K. Competition Appeal Tribunal awarded compensatory as well 
as “exemplary” (i.e., punitive) damages for abuse of a dominant position.200  
Second, aggregate litigation presents another example of a traditionally 
American, long-disdained practice that is gaining acceptance abroad.201 Collec-
tive action mechanisms are appearing in various guises across Europe. Unlike 
U.S.-style opt-out class actions, these are often, but not exclusively, in opt-in 
form. 202  France and Belgium, for example, adopted class action laws in 
2014.203 In Canada, most provinces now permit American-style opt-out class 
actions,204 with courts consistently lowering standards for class certification.205 
 
196. See KELEMEN, supra note 185, at 176, 180, 182-87, 189-94. 
197. See infra note 244 (discussing a $353.6 million settlement approved by Dutch 
courts against Shell). Settlements this high suggest that judgments and/or litigation costs 
could have been even higher. 
198. KELEMEN, supra note 185, at 73; Behrens et al., supra note 193, at 192-93. 
199. KELEMEN, supra note 185, at 73; Christopher Hodges, Europe: Part 1, in 
RANDALL L. GOODDEN, LAWSUIT!: REDUCING THE RISK OF PRODUCT LIABILITY FOR 
MANUFACTURERS 71, 75 (2009); Tate E. McLeod, “Never Having to Say You’re Sorry”: Are 
Canadian Punitive Damage Awards on the Rise?, MONDAQ (Feb. 18, 2014), http:// 
www.mondaq.com/canada/x/293946/trials+appeals+compensation/Never+Having+To+Say+
Youre+Sorry+Are+Canadian+Punitive+Damage+Awards+On+The+Rise; Wendy Zeldin, 
Thailand: First Product Liability Law Coming into Force, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://www.loc 
.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l20540988_text (last updated Feb. 5, 2009).  
200. 2 Travel Grp. plc (in liquidation) v. Cardiff City Transp. Servs., [2012] CAT 19 
(U.K.). 
201. See, e.g., Behrens et al., supra note 193, at 167-68; Deborah R. Hensler, The Fu-
ture of Mass Litigation: Global Class Actions and Third-Party Litigation Funding, 79 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 306, 307 (2011). The pace and scope of these developments varies from 
country to country. See Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil—A Model for Civil Law Coun-
tries, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 311, 312-13 (2003). 
202. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation 
Come to Europe?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 179, 202 (2009); Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Liti-
gation Across the Atlantic and the Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 
21-25 (2009). 
203. Loi 2014-344 du 17 mars 2014 relative à la consommation [Law 2014-344 of 
March 17, 2014, on Consumption], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 18, 2014, p. 5400; S. Voet, Belgium’s New Consumer 
Class Action, in MULTI-PARTY REDRESS MECHANISMS IN EUROPE: SQUEAKING MICE? 95, 96 
(V. Harsági & C.H. van Rhee eds., 2014). 
204. WORLD CLASS ACTIONS: A GUIDE TO GROUP AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS 
AROUND THE GLOBE 63-65 (Paul G. Karlsgodt ed., 2012) (noting that all jurisdictions pro-
vide some mechanism for opt-in collective litigation, and that “[o]pt-out models vary by ju-
risdiction”). 
205. See, e.g., Watson v. Bank of Am. Corp., 2014 BCSC 532, paras. 58-75 (Can.); 
Robert Staley et al., Canadian Court Certifies Visa/Mastercard Class Action, MONDAQ (Apr. 
3, 2014), http://www.mondaq.com/canada/x/304426/Antitrust+Competition/Canadian+Court 
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In addition, several Latin American countries, Australia, Israel, Indonesia, 
South Africa, and Taiwan have also developed sophisticated structures for col-
lective litigation that could involve plaintiffs or defendants who are foreign na-
tionals.206  
Third, and just as importantly, some foreign legal systems are beginning to 
permit alternative litigation funding structures.207 This development both facili-
tates transnational litigation in foreign courts and reflects the growth of high-
stakes litigation abroad.208 
The structure of who pays litigation fees is another widely cited difference 
between American and foreign litigation. In the United States, each party typi-
cally bears its own litigation costs, and plaintiffs who cannot manage the costs 
may hire counsel on contingency.209 Abroad, however, the rule is “loser pays,” 
and contingency fees are widely outlawed.210 Both of these rules discourage 
plaintiffs from filing lawsuits.  
But some countries, most prominently the United Kingdom, Australia, and 
Canada, are beginning to recognize the benefits of allowing parties other than 
the plaintiffs to sponsor the initial filing of lawsuits.211 Additional European 
 
+Certifies+VisaMastercard+Class+Action (“Watson continues a trend in which the [Canadi-
an] courts appear determined to lower the bar to certification . . . .”). 
206. See, e.g., Gray v Cash Converters Int’l Ltd. [2014] FCA 420 (2 May 2014) 36-46 
(Austl.) (relaxing requirements for initiating class actions in Australia); Gidi, supra note 201, 
at 312-13; Manuel A. Gómez, Will the Birds Stay South? The Rise of Class Actions and Oth-
er Forms of Group Litigation Across Latin America, 43 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 481 
(2012) (discussing developments in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico); 
Hensler, supra note 201, at 307 (noting that class action rules have been adopted in Israel, 
Indonesia, South Africa, and Taiwan, among other countries). 
207. See, e.g., Behrens et al., supra note 193, at 183-87; Cassandra Burke Robertson, 
The Impact of Third-Party Financing on Transnational Litigation, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L 
L. 159, 161 (2011). 
208. These developments parallel increasing legal costs in Europe. The United States 
has “the highest liability costs as a percentage of GDP” of any country surveyed in Europe or 
North America, but “liability costs in the U.K., Germany and Denmark have risen between 
13% and 25% per year since 2008.” DAVID L. MCKNIGHT & PAUL J. HINTON, U.S. CHAMBER 
INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF LITIGATION COSTS: EUROPE, THE 
UNITED STATES AND CANADA 2 (2013), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com 
/uploads/sites/1/NERA_FULL.pdf. 
209. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal 
Practice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 267-68 (1998) (discussing contingency fees in the United 
States). 
210. The “English Rule,” the predominant practice almost everywhere, “provides that 
the losing party is responsible for the winning party’s legal fees,” and typically precludes 
contingency fee arrangements. Brandon Chad Bungard, Fee! Fie! Foe! Fum!: I Smell the 
Efficiency of the English Rule: Finding the Right Approach to Tort Reform, 31 SETON HALL 
LEGIS. J. 1, 6-7 (2006); Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Plaintiffs’ Lawsuits: An Increasingly 
Popular (and Legal) Business, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 57, 72 (2000) (noting that most 
countries “outlaw contingency legal fees,” although England, which had traditionally taken 
that approach, modified it in the 1990s).  
211. See Dugal v. Manulife Fin. Corp., 2011 ONSC 1785, 105 O.R. 3d 364, paras. 1-2 
(Can.) (endorsing third-party litigation funding in Canada); Behrens et al., supra note 193, at 
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countries are beginning to permit conditional fee arrangements, contingency 
fees, and third-party litigation funding.212 Legal expenses insurance is also be-
coming more popular, further mitigating the effects of the “loser pays” rule.213 
Experts have begun to take note that “[t]he combination of global class actions 
with third-party litigation funding may prove to be a truly ‘disruptive innova-
tion’ that changes the nature of private civil litigation worldwide.”214 
These developments are occurring in a fertile petri dish of favorable and 
potentially far-reaching substantive laws. The United States has a reputation for 
choice-of-law rules that favor forum law and plaintiff-friendly substantive law. 
But many foreign courts also use choice-of-law rules to apply the stricter (and 
thus more plaintiff-friendly) law.215 And many of the American substantive 
rules have gained traction abroad. In the realm of product liability, for example, 
the United States was once one of the only places to recognize strict liability, 
but this doctrine is increasingly the general rule throughout the world.216 Eu-
rope notoriously has stricter standards for antitrust liability, Internet privacy, 
and consumer and environmental protection.217 Many of these laws, moreover, 
extend beyond the European Union’s borders in unusual ways.218 In the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands, for instance, corporations may be held liable for 
domestic conduct that contributed to or failed to prevent extraterritorial human 
rights abuses.219  
Finally, many foreign courts recognize jurisdiction over foreign defendants 
in ways that are as expansive as or even more so than American courts. In Eu-
rope, jurisdictional rules of national courts, including some of the more contro-
versial (or “exorbitant”) bases for jurisdiction that European states have agreed 
not to apply to each other’s domiciliaries, do apply in cases involving non-E.U. 
 
183-87; Hensler, supra note 201, at 321 (discussing the evolution of third-party litigation 
funding in Australia); Robertson, supra note 207, at 161. 
212. KELEMEN, supra note 185, at 66-68; Hodges, supra note 199, at 75. 
213. KELEMEN, supra note 185, at 68-71; LLOYD’S, LITIGATION AND BUSINESS: TRANS-
ATLANTIC TRENDS 7, 10 (2008). 
214. Hensler, supra note 201, at 323; see also Robertson, supra note 207, at 168 (sug-
gesting that litigation finance may offset U.S. courts’ “traditional magnet effect”). 
215. See SYMEONIDES, supra note 30, at 273-76 (describing rules that allow victims of 
cross-border torts to choose more favorable law); id. at 287 (concluding that plaintiff-
oriented choice-of-law rules are not exclusive to the United States).  
216. Compare Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 n.18 (1981) (“[S]trict lia-
bility remains primarily an American innovation.”), and Sheila L. Birnbaum & Douglas W. 
Dunham, Foreign Plaintiffs and Forum Non Conveniens, 16 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 241, 242-43 
(1990) (noting that few foreign countries have adopted strict liability), with GOODDEN, supra 
note 199, ch. 2, at 35-91 (observing that strict liability is becoming increasingly common). 
217. See, e.g., Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 15, 20, 22-23 
(2012). 
218. See, e.g., id. at 64 (describing the global effect of E.U. laws); Joanne Scott, Extra-
territoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 87, 89 (2014). 
219. See Jodie A. Kirshner, Why Is the U.S. Abdicating the Policing of Multinational 
Corporations to Europe?: Extraterritoriality, Sovereignty, and the Alien Tort Statute, 30 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 259, 279, 281 (2012). 
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domiciliaries, including Americans.220 This means, for example, that French 
courts may have jurisdiction in cases solely because they are brought by French 
domiciliaries221 and British courts may have jurisdiction so long as the defend-
ant was served in the forum.222 Canadian conceptions of jurisdiction yield re-
sults similar to the pre-Daimler “doing business” U.S. standards.223  
Other nations224 also recognize a “forum of necessity” doctrine, which 
provides jurisdiction under certain circumstances if there is no other available 
forum, particularly if the plaintiffs are local residents.225 For example, a Dutch 
court recognized “forum of necessity” jurisdiction in a case in which a Palestin-
ian doctor sued unidentified Libyan government officials for unlawful impris-
onment in Libya. 226 The suit’s only connection to the Netherlands was the 
plaintiff’s presence there.227 
Finally, few foreign courts have the kind of “reverse forum shopping” tools 
that avoidance doctrines provide for defendants in U.S. courts.228 Most nations 
 
220. See Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 60, arts. 3, 4; id. Annex I (dictating 
that a set of exorbitant rules is unavailable as between E.U. parties, but available against 
non-E.U. parties); Borchers, supra note 64, at 2 (discussing the European Union’s “contin-
ued use of exorbitant jurisdictional bases against non-E.U. defendants”). 
221. Silberman, supra note 53, at 607 & n.94. Jurisdiction based on the plaintiff’s 
French nationality is admittedly highly controversial and employed infrequently. See gener-
ally Kevin M. Clermont & John R.B. Palmer, French Article 14 Jurisdiction, Viewed from 
the United States, in DE TOUS HORIZONS: MÉLANGES XAVIER BLANC-JOUVAN 473 (2005). 
222. See Borchers, supra note 64, at 5 (discussing “the common law countries,” which 
include the United Kingdom). 
223. See Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572 (Can.) (af-
firming a finding of jurisdiction over a Cayman Islands-incorporated defendant for torts that 
occurred at the defendant’s hotels in Cuba); Tanya J. Monestier, (Still) a “Real and Substan-
tial” Mess: The Law of Jurisdiction in Canada, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 396, 413 (2013) (an-
alyzing the four “presumptive connecting factors that prima facie entitle a [Canadian] court 
to assume jurisdiction over a dispute,” including that “the defendant carries on business in 
the province”). 
224. Switzerland, Belgium, Mexico, the Netherlands, Uruguay, Argentina, Austria, 
Costa Rica, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Spain, and Turkey have all adopted a version of 
the forum of necessity doctrine. Chilenye Nwapi, Jurisdiction by Necessity and the Regula-
tion of the Transnational Corporate Actor, 30 UTRECHT J. INT’L & EUR. L. 24, 31-32 (2014). 
225. It is unclear whether Canada is a part of this trend. See Van Breda v. Vill. Resorts 
Ltd., 2010 ONCA 84, 98 O.R. 3d 721, para. 54 (Can.) (recognizing “forum of necessity” ju-
risdiction), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Club Resorts, 2012 SCC 17, 1 S.C.R. 572; 
Monestier, supra note 223, at 452-53. But cf. Anvil Mining Ltd. c. Ass’n Canadienne Contre 
L’Impunité, 2012 QCCA 117, [2012] R.J.Q. 153 (Can.) (rejecting an argument that Quebec 
was the forum of necessity). 
226. Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 21 maart 2012 m.nt. Van der Helm, No. 400882 / HA ZA 11-
2252 (El-Hojouj/Derbal) (Neth.). 
227. See Nicola Jägers et al., The Future of Corporate Liability for Extraterritorial 
Human Rights Abuses: The Dutch Case Against Shell, AJIL UNBOUND (Jan. 2014), reprinted 
in AGORA: REFLECTIONS ON KIOBEL, at e-36, e-38 (2014), available at http://www.asil.org 
/sites/default/files/AGORA/201401/AJIL%20Agora-%20Reflections%20on%20Kiobel.pdf. 
228. “Reverse forum shopping” refers to defense efforts to select the forum—for exam-
ple, through a forum non conveniens dismissal. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 78, at 826 n.199. 
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lack American-style due process protections for defendants sued in their 
courts.229 Forum non conveniens tends to be either nonexistent or much less 
permissive in most other countries.230  
B. The Resulting Legal Landscape 
As a result of the combination of developments in U.S. and foreign courts, 
more and more transnational disputes—particularly in certain categories of cas-
es—are appearing in foreign fora. They may be refiled in foreign courts after 
they are dismissed from U.S. court, filed in foreign courts instead of in U.S. 
court, or filed in foreign courts in parallel with U.S. litigation.231 These cases 
usually have some connection to the forum in which they are brought, but this 
fact should not undermine the significance of the development.232 As for trans-
national litigation with only remote connections to the forum, Canada and the 
Netherlands are currently the most likely countries to entertain such suits.233 
Although it is too early to see the full effects of the recent Supreme Court 
decisions and still-emerging foreign trends,234 evidence of the transition toward 
foreign fora is beginning to appear.235 I do not claim that avoidance trends are 
causing the foreign developments but rather that they are contributing to plain-
 
229. In contrast to civil law jurisdictions, which focus on a court’s “competen[ce]” to 
hear a case, “[t]he U.S. system of jurisdiction is defendant-friendly precisely because our 
Supreme Court has made jurisdiction a constitutional issue based on the due process ‘rights’ 
of the defendant.” Brand, supra note 56, at 78-79 (emphasis omitted). 
230. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
231. Of course, because the foreign developments described here will not perfectly, or 
even mostly, replace the opportunities for litigation that U.S. courts used to offer, avoidance 
doctrines nevertheless will cause some litigation either to be dismissed from U.S. court and 
not filed elsewhere, or to fail to be brought in the first instance.  
232. Almost any suit sustainable in U.S. court—before or after these avoidance devel-
opments—also requires some local connection. (The Alien Tort Statute used to provide the 
major exception to this rule.)  
233. See infra notes 241-60 and accompanying text. 
234. It is likely too early to empirically assess the effect of the recent avoidance deci-
sions on litigation trends, and doing so when the time is ripe will likely be challenging. See, 
e.g., Donald Earl Childress III, Rethinking Legal Globalization: The Case of Transnational 
Personal Jurisdiction, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1507 (2013) (discussing limitations 
on empirical evidence).  
235. See, e.g., Quintanilla & Whytock, supra note 184, at 33-35; Katy Dowell, Interna-
tional Litigants in London Rise by a Third in Three Years, LAWYER (May 7, 2013), 
http://www.thelawyer.com/news-and-analysis/practice-areas/litigation/international-litigants 
-inlondon-rise-by-a-third-in-three-years/3004520.article (noting the rise of U.S. litigants in 
English courts); William F. Sullivan et al., A Global Concern: The Rise of International Se-
curities Litigation, BLOOMBERG BNA (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.bna.com/a-global-concern 
-the-rise-of-international-securities-litigation. For some examples of U.S. cases mentioning 
parallel or prior-filed foreign suits, see Lam Yeen Leng v. Pinnacle Performance Ltd., 474 F. 
App’x 810 (2d Cir. 2012) (in Singapore); Bailey Shipping Ltd. v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, 
No. 12 Civ. 5959(KPF), 2013 WL 5312540 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2013) (in Greece); and Sec. 
Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 474 B.R. 76, 79 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (in the Cayman Islands).  
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tiffs’ choices to bring suits abroad. Some commentators contend that foreign-
judgment enforcement actions are growing in U.S. courts.236 This trend sug-
gests plaintiffs are suing in foreign courts, which may then impose substantial 
judgments on companies with U.S. assets.  
This may be happening in two main ways. First, some plaintiffs are refiling 
lawsuits in foreign courts after U.S. courts dismiss them on avoidance 
grounds.237 Although avoidance doctrines, especially forum non conveniens, 
have ostensibly contemplated this happening for decades, in practice such refil-
ing rarely occurred.238  
Second, plaintiffs may bring certain types of cases in foreign fora in the 
first instance.239 In these types of cases, the United States is no longer pre-
sumptively plaintiffs’ favorite forum. Securities, environmental, and human 
rights litigation provide examples of types of litigation that are gradually mi-
grating abroad.240  
Global securities litigation, for example, is beginning to move to the Neth-
erlands and Canada, even in cases in which the only connection to the forum is 
that some of the plaintiff-investors were citizens of those countries—a rather 
low threshold.241 Both fora have replicated some of the most attractive attrib-
utes of the U.S. litigation system.242  
 
236. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. THOMSON & PERLETTE MICHÈLE JURA, U.S. CHAMBER INST. 
FOR LEGAL REFORM, CONFRONTING THE NEW BREED OF TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION: 
ABUSIVE FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 6 & n.40 (2011), available at http://www.instituteforlegal 
reform.com/uploads/sites/1/TransnationalLitigation_AbusiveForeignJudgments.pdf; Quinta-
nilla & Whytock, supra note 184, at 35. 
237. See, e.g., Childress, supra note 27, at 23 (noting that the plaintiffs in Morrison re-
filed their suit in Australia after its dismissal from U.S. courts); Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. 
Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law After Morri-
son v. National Australia Bank, 97 MINN. L. REV. 132, 175-77 (2012) (discussing cases re-
filed abroad after U.S. dismissal). 
238. See supra note 184. 
239. See, e.g., Childress, supra note 27, at 6. 
240. This phenomenon happens in other areas as well. See, e.g., Allianz Suisse 
Versicherungs-Gesellschaft v. Miller, 24 F. Supp. 3d 670, 672 (W.D. Mich. 2014) (discuss-
ing an insurance action brought in Switzerland against a U.S. defendant); L’Institute Nation-
al de L’Audiovisuel v. Kultur Int’l Films, Ltd., No. 11-6309, 2012 WL 296997, at *1 (D.N.J. 
Feb. 1, 2012) (discussing a copyright action brought in France against a U.S. defendant). But 
cf., e.g., Martin Gelter, Why Do Shareholder Derivative Suits Remain Rare in Continental 
Europe?, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 843 (2012). 
241. Childress, supra note 27, at 27-28; infra note 244. 
242. See Kaal & Painter, supra note 237, at 138-40 (discussing the Netherlands); id. at 
186-90 (discussing Canada). Indeed, Dutch courts have recognized U.S. opt-out global class 
action awards, reasoning that the procedures that lead to those awards are similar to Dutch 
procedures. See Ianika Tzankova & Hélène van Lith, Class Actions and Class Settlements 
Going Global: The Netherlands, in EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND COLLECTIVE REDRESS 67, 89 
(Duncan Fairgrieve & Eva Lein eds., 2012) (describing the Ahold litigation in the United 
States and the Netherlands); Netherlands: Amsterdam Court Recognizes US Class Settle-
ment, 3 GLOBAL COMPETITION LITIG. REV. R-66 (2010). 
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The Dutch have created an innovative collective settlement procedure un-
der which putative plaintiffs and defendants “can jointly petition the Amster-
dam Court of Appeals to approve the settlement and make [it] binding on all 
class members who do not opt out.”243 Dutch civil procedure affords Dutch 
courts jurisdiction if at least one of the plaintiffs requesting the declaration or 
one of the defendants is a Dutch domiciliary.244  
Canada is also becoming an increasingly popular jurisdiction for bringing 
transnational securities litigation.245 Securities actions in Ontario,246 for exam-
ple, are not limited to securities traded on Canadian exchanges (if the issuer has 
sufficient connections to Canada)247 and can include plaintiffs from all over the 
world.248 On the merits, Ontario also does not require plaintiffs to prove reli-
ance to certify a class.249 And while the Ontario Securities Act caps a defend-
ant corporation’s liability, this provision does not apply to knowing misrepre-
sentations or other potential damages, which limits the cap’s practical effect.250 
Some environmental tort litigation is also going overseas. For example, 
Nigerian plaintiffs sued Royal Dutch Shell and its Nigerian subsidiary in a 
 
243. Hensler, supra note 201, at 311.  
244. WETBOEK VAN BURGERLIJKE RECHTSVORDERING [RV] art. III (Neth.). In the most 
significant (and largest) settlement under the Dutch collective settlement procedure to date, 
Shell Petroleum settled securities fraud claims (originally brought as a global class action in 
the United States) with plaintiffs from more than 100 countries (but not the United States) 
for over $350 million. Considering the fees awarded in the U.S. and Dutch proceedings, 
Deborah Hensler has calculated that both Shell and the U.S. plaintiffs’ lawyers involved in 
the settlement (if not also the plaintiffs themselves) appear to have fared at least as well as, if 
not better than, they would have in U.S. court. Hensler, supra note 201, at 319. 
245. Ashby Jones, Lawyers Looking to Canada for Shareholder Litigation, WALL ST. J. 
(Feb. 27, 2012), http://on.wsj.com/1DKPfsb; see also Noam Noked, A New Playbook for 
Global Securities Litigation and Regulation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. 
REG. (Feb. 2, 2012, 9:53 AM), https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/02/02/a-new 
-playbook-for-global-securities-litigation-and-regulation (noting that currently pending Ca-
nadian securities class actions “represent approximately $15.9 billion in claims”). 
246. Canadian securities law is made at the provincial, not federal, level. Tanya J. 
Monestier, Is Canada the New Shangri-La of Global Securities Class Actions?, 32 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 305, 317 n.49 (2012). 
247. See Abdula v. Can. Solar Inc., 2012 ONCA 211, 110 O.R. 3d 256, paras. 72-81 
(Can.); Kevin LaCroix, Ontario Court: Company with Shares Trading Only on Foreign Ex-
change Subject to Canadian Securities Suit, D&O DIARY (May 4, 2012), http:// 
www.dandodiary.com/2012/05/articles/international-d-o/ontario-court-company-with-shares 
-trading-only-on-foreign-exchange-subject-to-canadian-securities-suit. 
248. See Silver v. IMAX Corp., 2011 ONSC 1035, 105 O.R. 3d 212, paras. 57-69 
(Can.) (certifying a global class in a suit against a Canadian company that traded on the 
NASDAQ); Daniel Jutras, The American Illness and Comparative Civil Procedure, in THE 
AMERICAN ILLNESS: ESSAYS ON THE RULE OF LAW 159, 168 (F.H. Buckley ed., 2013); 
Monestier, supra note 246, at 319 (discussing the potential consequences of the growth of 
global class actions in Canada). 
249. See, e.g., Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, s. 138.3 (Can.); BRIAN ANDERSON & 
ANDREW TRASK, THE CLASS ACTION PLAYBOOK 294 (2d ed. 2012). 
250. See Securities Act s. 138.7; Sullivan et al., supra note 235. 
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Dutch court, alleging damages resulting from an oil spill in Nigeria.251 The 
court held the wholly owned Nigerian subsidiary liable to compensate one 
farmer but dismissed claims against the Dutch parent company. 252  To the 
Dutch court, the suit against the Nigerian subsidiary was foreign-cubed, but 
that did not stay the court’s hand. Had the Dutch court followed American 
avoidance doctrines, it would have determined that it had no personal jurisdic-
tion over the Nigerian subsidiary. Instead, it applied the substantive law of Ni-
geria.253 This expansive concept of jurisdiction may make the Netherlands a 
choice destination for environmental and other transnational tort litigation.254 
In the area of human rights litigation, Canada, several European nations, 
and the European Union are “loosening constraints on corporate liability.”255 
Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, for example, all appear to 
offer potential fora for such suits.256 Canadian courts hold parent companies 
liable in negligence for failing to prevent foreign subsidiaries’ human rights 
abuses in circumstances where, in the United States, the parent would likely be 
protected by the corporate veil.257 This practice can circumvent restrictions on 
enforcing laws extraterritorially without addressing the extraterritoriality issue 
directly. In the United Kingdom, four out of five business human rights dis-
putes litigated to conclusion (80%) have resulted in a payout, compared to 
9.5% for U.S. corporate alien tort suits.258 Similar cases in the United Kingdom 
have settled for tens of millions of dollars.259 Dutch courts recognize corporate 
liability for human rights abuses under domestic tort law regardless of the loca-
tion of the harms if the defendant has a domicile or headquarters in the Nether-
lands or if the defendant’s place of residence is unknown, as was the case in the 
 
251. Ivana Sekularac & Anthony Deutsch, Dutch Court Says Shell Responsible for Ni-
geria Spills, REUTERS UK (Jan. 30, 2013), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/01/30/uk-shell 
-nigeria-lawsuit-idUKBRE90T0DC20130130. A parallel suit is pending before the High 
Court of London. Laura Carballo Piñeiro & Xandra Kramer, The Role of Private Interna-
tional Law in Contemporary Society: Global Governance as a Challenge, 7 ERASMUS L. 
REV. 109, 109 n.4 (2014). 
252. Sekularac & Deutsch, supra note 251. 
253. Childress, supra note 27, at 6. 
254. See Jägers et al., supra note 219, at 38-39. 
255. Caroline Kaeb & David Scheffer, The Paradox of Kiobel in Europe, 107 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 852, 854 (2013). 
256. For a list of nations that provide for legal codification of criminal and often also 
joint civil liability for extraterritorial corporate conduct pertaining to international crimes, 
see Supplemental Brief of Ambassador David J. Scheffer, Northwestern University School 
of Law, as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 15-20, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Pet-
rol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491), 2012 WL 2165350. 
257. See, e.g., Choc v. Hudbay Minerals Inc., 2013 ONSC 998, paras. 49, 54-58 (Can.). 
258. Michael D. Goldhaber, Corporate Human Rights Litigation in Non-U.S. Courts: A 
Comparative Scorecard, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 127, 131 (2013). 
259. Id. at 130-31. 
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litigation brought by the Palestinian doctor against unidentified Libyan offi-
cials.260 
These developments have the potential to shape the landscape of litigation 
and liability worldwide.261 Due in part to U.S. litigation isolationism, foreign 
courts may be increasingly attractive for foreign plaintiffs suing multinational 
corporations. Recognizing this eventuality, Donald Childress has called atten-
tion to the emergence of a law market for transnational litigation.262 This mar-
ket is a means of understanding how domestic and foreign courts compete 
through their legal regimes for transnational litigation.263 But scholarship has 
not yet evaluated the systemic impact of these trends or their interaction with 
U.S. transnational litigation avoidance doctrines in terms of those doctrines’ 
ability to accomplish their stated goals or otherwise further U.S. interests.264 
III. JUDGING AVOIDANCE 
Until this point, this Article has shown the development of litigation isola-
tionism, identified its stated goals, and demonstrated the forces embracing 
transnational litigation in foreign courts. It now turns to consider whether, in 
light of these foreign court developments, avoidance decisions have accom-
plished their stated goals of protecting separation of powers, international 
comity, and defendants’ convenience.  
To some extent, the answer would seem to be yes, notwithstanding any 
foreign court trends. First, avoidance developments appear to reduce burdens 
on separation of powers and international comity simply by having courts not 
adjudicate contentious cases that could create such concerns. By hearing fewer 
transnational cases, U.S. courts seem to prevent themselves from interfering 
with political branch prerogatives or offending foreign nations.  
Second, by making it easier for defendants to win pretrial dispositive mo-
tions and by discouraging plaintiffs from suing in U.S. courts, avoidance allevi-
ates many burdens on defendants. Defendants’ belief that foreign litigation will 
be less onerous than U.S. litigation is not unfounded. Even accounting for re-
cent developments, foreign nations still tend to have less costly litigation,265 
less expansive discovery rules,266 lower damages awards,267 and a “loser pays” 
 
260. Jägers et al., supra note 219, at 36-41; see supra text accompanying note 226 (dis-
cussing the Palestinian doctor’s case). 
261. Civil antitrust or products liability litigation may be areas in which there is further 
future expansion in the European Union. See KELEMEN, supra note 185, at 171-194 (discuss-
ing antitrust); Rod Freeman, Europe: Part 2, in GOODDEN, supra note 199, at 76, 82 (dis-
cussing product liability). 
262. See Childress, supra note 27, at 9. 
263. Id. at 7. 
264. Cf. supra note 29 (discussing Childress’s work in this field). 
265. See MCKNIGHT & HINTON, supra note 208, at 1-2. 
266. See Robert Hardaway et al., E-Discovery’s Threat to Civil Litigation: Reevaluating 
Rule 26 for the Digital Age, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 521, 524 (2011). 
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funding system that can provide winning defendants with attorneys’ fees.268 
Limiting jurisdiction over foreign defendants also seems to lessen any per-
ceived “litigation tax” of doing business in the United States, at least for for-
eign defendants, which seems to benefit the U.S. economy.269 
But these first impressions of avoidance’s unmitigated success are decep-
tive. In fact, avoidance does little to address separation of powers and interna-
tional comity concerns because federal courts are still the major decisionmakers 
in deciding whether to entertain transnational suits. And hearing too few trans-
national cases, like hearing too many, can also offend foreign sovereigns and 
therefore interfere with political branch prerogatives. Furthermore, while most 
assume that excluding transnational cases is negative for plaintiffs but positive 
for defendants, litigation isolationism has unappreciated negative effects for all 
U.S. parties—both plaintiffs and defendants—and more broadly for U.S. sover-
eign interests.  
A. Separation of Powers and International Comity 
Avoidance doctrines strive to prevent federal courts from interfering with 
foreign relations policies that should be controlled by the political branches and 
from disrupting international comity in the process. But, as judicially driven 
developments mostly uninformed by international law or practice, they are 
simply ill equipped to do so. A signature feature of avoidance doctrines is the 
lack of political branch input and the domination of the area by courts. U.S. 
courts were long criticized for expanding transnational litigation. Today, courts 
have gone too far in the opposite direction.  
Entertaining “too little” transnational litigation can raise the same separa-
tion of powers concerns as entertaining too much. In articulating the costs to 
U.S. democracy of international human rights litigation, Curtis Bradley has 
noted that the separation of powers problems that come from courts “in-
vent[ing]” procedures to facilitate that kind of litigation (such as holding that 
customary international law has the status of federal common law) are likewise 
apparent in judicially created doctrines designed to limit such litigation (such as 
the political question doctrine and international comity).270 The same can be 
said of similar judicially driven developments in areas of transnational litiga-
tion more generally. Cabining transnational overreach through judicially creat-
ed avoidance doctrines does little to ameliorate the separation of powers prob-
lem the overreach created. The problem is a result of court (as opposed to 
political branch) control over these issues. Avoidance has not made that go 
away. Instead, it has flipped the question to whether the federal courts are now 
 
267. This is, at least, the conventional wisdom. See Borchers, supra note 64, at 19; 
Childress, supra note 27, at 4. 
268. See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
269. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
270. Bradley, supra note 117, at 466-67. 
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excluding (rather than including) transnational litigation out of keeping with 
political branch prerogatives and in a manner that interferes with the executive 
branch’s conduct of foreign affairs.271  
Similarly, avoiding transnational litigation beyond international standards 
does not necessarily preserve international comity. By eliminating categories of 
contentious cases from U.S. courts, the developments described here prevent 
U.S. courts from offending foreign nations or interfering with their regulatory 
authority to some extent.272 If international law creates only a ceiling on the 
kinds of transnational cases domestic courts can hear and avoidance consistent-
ly keeps American courts below this ceiling, one might think avoidance had 
achieved this goal. 
But there should also be a jurisdictional floor. Scholars have debated 
whether customary international law governs adjudicatory jurisdiction.273 If it 
does govern this area, international law typically establishes the outer limits of 
a state’s authority, not baseline requirements for how to exercise it.274 But even 
if neither domestic nor international law requires a jurisdictional floor, U.S. 
sovereign interests and widely accepted international practice counsel in favor 
of one. There remains the potential for offending foreign sovereigns (or for in-
terfering with foreign relations, when those are two different things) by not 
hearing cases in certain subject matter areas,275 discriminating against foreign 
plaintiffs who are kept out of U.S. courts (e.g., through forum non 
 
271. Avoidance decisions sometimes appear to disregard executive preferences. For ex-
ample, in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., the Court rejected the Solicitor Gen-
eral’s proposed resolution of that case despite her arguments that her proposal, inter alia, 
complied with international comity. See 561 U.S. 247, 270-72 (2010). But cf. Daimler AG v. 
Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014) (incorporating considerations raised by the Solicitor 
General).  
272. See Noll, supra note 23, at 44. 
273. Compare, e.g., JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 472 (8th ed. 2012) (explaining that international law requires nations to 
maintain courts and hear certain cases), with JAMES FAWCETT & JANEEN M. CARRUTHERS, 
CHESHIRE, NORTH & FAWCETT: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (14th ed. 2008) (stating that, 
unlike public international law, “[p]rivate international law is not the same in all countries”). 
274. See Rebecca Ingber, International Law Constraints as Executive Power, 57 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 10) (on file with author) (noting that interna-
tional law is “conventionally understood in terms of constraint on state actors”); F.A. Mann, 
The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, 111 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 9-10 (1964). 
But cf. CRAWFORD, supra note 273, at 472 (arguing that there is a jurisdictional floor).  
275. See, e.g., Statement of Interest of the United States, Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 
232 (2d Cir. 1995) (Nos. 94-9035, 94-9069), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp 
-content/uploads/2012/07/Doe-I-v-Karadzic-US-Statement-of-Interest-Sept-1995.pdf (argu-
ing that the Second Circuit should order the district court to consider the case); Memoran-
dum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 22-23, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 
(2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090), 1980 WL 340146 (arguing that “a refusal to recognize a pri-
vate cause of action . . . might seriously damage the credibility of our nation’s commitment 
to the protection of human rights”). 
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conveniens),276 or “routinely dismissing foreign claims against American mul-
tinationals.”277 The first two categories are even more problematic when they 
appear simultaneously with the third—that is, when the defendants are Ameri-
can nationals.278  
This floor should take the form of at least a presumption that U.S. courts 
will exercise their jurisdiction in cases in which the United States has clear in-
terests279—for example, cases involving U.S. defendants. In other words, when 
courts have personal jurisdiction over local defendants—which home fora will 
have in cases against American defendants after Daimler—they should usually 
exercise it.280  
A defendant can traditionally be sued in its home forum. That forum is 
usually recognized as both fair and reasonably convenient for the defendant.281 
Moreover, it is also understood that the defendant’s home forum has a sover-
eign interest in hearing a case against one of its own.282 Goodyear and Daimler 
seem to assume this;283 foreign courts assume this;284 the executive branch as-
 
276. See Brief of the Republic of Ecuador as Amicus Curiae at 4-5, Aguinda v. Texaco, 
Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002) (Nos. 01-7756L, 01-7758C), 2001 WL 34369154 (urging 
the court not to dismiss the Ecuadorians’ suit); RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON 
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 300-01 (6th ed. 2010) (noting that a failure to afford equal court ac-
cess to foreign plaintiffs may violate treaties to which the United States is a signatory); 
Briggs, supra note 147, at 119-21. In 2008, a French court took the unusual step of declining 
jurisdiction in an airplane accident lawsuit “in order to enable the plaintiffs to go back to 
California and resume the proceedings that they had initiated there.” Gilles Cuniberti, 
French Court Declines Jurisdiction to Transfer Dispute Back to U.S. Court, CONFLICT OF 
LAWS .NET (Mar. 27, 2008), http://conflictoflaws.net/2008/french-court-declines-jurisdiction 
-to-transfer-dispute-back-to-us-court. The State Department has also discouraged U.S. states 
from excluding certain categories of transnational litigation. See Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 
136, 142 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that the Governor of New York had vetoed a statute of limi-
tations bill because the State Department had advised that “if it went into effect, [it] would 
have caused New York to become ‘a haven for cultural property stolen abroad’” (quoting 
Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 430 (N.Y. 1991))).  
277. Lear, supra note 141, at 563. 
278. See, e.g., In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 15 F. Supp. 3d 454, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(declining to apply Kiobel’s strengthened presumption against extraterritoriality in a suit 
against U.S. defendants). 
279. The standard I envision for “clear interests” for a jurisdictional floor, particularly 
in cases involving U.S. defendants, would be lower than the bar set by interest analysis in the 
choice-of-law context. Interest analysis typically asks which state has the strongest connec-
tion to the case. See SYMEONIDES, supra note 30, at 42-44. The jurisdictional floor proposed 
here builds on the “minimum” concept of “minimum contacts.” The jurisdictional question 
asks about sufficient contacts, which should be a lower standard. 
280. See supra Part I.A.1. 
281. See supra note 163. 
282. By contrast, forum non conveniens is often justified as a way of ensuring that do-
mestic courts are reserved for the disputes of the taxpayers that fund the judicial systems. See 
Robertson, supra note 71, at 1096. 
283. If “a court may assert jurisdiction over a foreign corporation,” Daimler AG v. 
Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014), when it is “essentially at home in the forum State,” id. 
(quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011)) 
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sumes this.285 And yet what Daimler establishes—personal jurisdiction over 
defendants sued at home—forum non conveniens takes away, at the court’s 
discretion, in many transnational cases against U.S. nationals. Even if interna-
tional law does not forbid this result, it is a problematic exercise of discretion 
because of the risk of undermining both foreign relations and U.S. sovereign 
interests in adjudicating cases against U.S. defendants. 
B. Consequences for U.S. Interests 
Opinions of avoidance doctrines tend to reflect sympathies for the interests 
of either plaintiffs or defendants.286 Scholars have either criticized the expan-
sion of avoidance for reducing access to justice287 or endorsed it as correcting 
inefficiencies created by forum shopping.288 Plaintiffs in these discussions tend 
to be individuals complaining of some injury, whereas defendants tend to be 
multinational corporations. This Subpart seeks to show that—contrary to con-
ventional wisdom—avoidance developments are not categorically good for de-
fendants and, with them, U.S. economic interests. To demonstrate this, I focus 
on the effects of avoiding three categories of transnational cases: suits against 
U.S. defendants, suits against foreign defendants, and suits brought by U.S. 
plaintiffs (against foreign or domestic defendants). 
1. Suits against U.S. defendants 
Bifurcating the world into the interests of plaintiffs and defendants, litiga-
tion isolationism’s results for American defendants do not seem troubling ini-
tially: the court permitted dismissal and the defendant requested it. Indeed, 
dismissing suits against U.S. defendants on these grounds undoubtedly benefits 
the defendant in that particular case, at least in the short term, and the decision 
whether to advance an avoidance defense should be up to that defendant.289 
 
(internal quotation mark omitted), then it appears, a fortiori, that a court may assert jurisdic-
tion over a domestic corporation when it is actually at home. 
284. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
285. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 
131, at 11-12 (recognizing that courts have jurisdiction over corporate defendants where they 
are “at home”). 
286. But cf. Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 883, 
884-85 (2002) (assessing similar issues in terms of global welfare).  
287. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 67, at 475-76; Whytock & Robertson, supra note 10, 
at 1450, 1453. 
288. See, e.g., Sykes, supra note 44, at 340. 
289. Most avoidance doctrines are advanced at the defendant’s discretion. Personal ju-
risdiction, forum non conveniens, and even abstention comity are all waivable. See Ins. 
Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982) (personal juris-
diction); Aguas Lenders Recovery Grp. v. Suez, S.A., 585 F.3d 696, 700 (2d Cir. 2009) (fo-
rum non conveniens); Maersk, Inc. v. Neewra, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 4356(CM), 2008 WL 
1986046, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2008) (international comity). The presumption against ex-
traterritoriality is not. See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 
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But widespread trends of avoidance dismissals in suits against U.S. defendants 
can have negative effects for U.S. defendants and U.S. interests at a macro lev-
el. 
To begin, these avoidance trends may “deprive” U.S. defendants of the 
benefits of their home forum, which is traditionally considered the most fair 
and convenient forum available.290 This is hardly a problem worth mentioning 
in particular cases in which defendants have forgone such advantages by mov-
ing for dismissal on avoidance grounds. But the overall effect of avoidance de-
velopments, combined with the expanding attractiveness of foreign courts de-
scribed here, is to drive plaintiffs to sue abroad in the first instance.291  
In such circumstances, common sense and anecdotal evidence suggest that 
U.S. defendants would try to have the case transferred to a U.S. court.292 The 
fact that U.S. defendants reverse forum shop out of U.S. court does not neces-
sarily reflect a systematic bias against U.S. courts; it may (at least sometimes) 
simply reflect good litigation strategy. No matter where the suit is brought, the 
basic incentives for defendants to reverse forum shop are almost always the 
same. The plaintiff sues in the jurisdiction most favorable to her, which, by def-
inition, will often be least favorable to the defendant. The defendant then 
moves to dismiss on any available grounds, including avoidance, for several 
reasons: to try to make the plaintiff settle or drop the case, which may be more 
likely if the plaintiff cannot litigate in her preferred forum; to make litigation 
more expensive, difficult, and complicated for the plaintiff; and then, if dismis-
sal does not make the case go away, to litigate in a more favorable forum.293  
Efforts to reverse forum shop out of foreign courts may also represent an 
appreciation that in the long run, American defendants may not fare well in 
 
(2010). But it is possible that the parties could jointly stipulate that a statute had extraterrito-
rial application, and a court could rely on that stipulation. See Henry Paul Monaghan, On 
Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 704-
05 (2012).  
290. See supra note 163.  
291. See supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
292. See, e.g., Grammer, Inc. v. Custom Foam Sys., Ltd., 482 F. Supp. 2d 853, 854-55 
(E.D. Mich. 2007) (identifying the case as parallel litigation in U.S. court following a Cana-
dian suit); Douez v. Facebook, Inc., 2014 BCSC 953, paras. 7, 29 (Can.) (declining to en-
force the California forum selection clause in Facebook’s terms of use or to dismiss the case 
on the basis of forum non conveniens); Stefan Vogenauer, Regulatory Competition Through 
Choice of Contract Law and Choice of Forum in Europe: Theory and Evidence, 21 EUR. 
REV. PRIV. L. 13, 44-45, 77 (2013) (arguing that choice of law and forum in contract clauses 
is driven primarily by familiarity with a legal system and judgments about its sophistication, 
at least in Europe and arguably in the United States as well). 
293. See, e.g., Robin Effron, Atlantic Marine and the Future of Forum Non Conveniens, 
66 HASTINGS L.J. 693, 707 (2015) (“The costs of restarting the action, both real and psycho-
logical, are likely higher than those associated with continuing to litigate an existing case in 
a different forum within the same judicial system.”); Thomas Orin Main, Toward a Law of 
“Lovely Parting Gifts”: Conditioning Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals, 18 SW. J. INT’L 
LAW 475, 478 (2012). 
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those courts.294 This may be true for several reasons. First, U.S. defendants will 
not have a “home court advantage,” and instead will themselves be foreigners 
in potentially unsympathetic courts.295 Second, U.S. defendants may also face 
less favorable procedures and judgments overseas.296 Rising costs of litigation 
and damages awards abroad297 should undermine intuitions that U.S. litigation 
always takes longer or is more expensive. And depending on the circumstances, 
such litigation may or may not in fact be more “convenient.”298 “Boomerang” 
litigation—going back and forth between U.S. and foreign courts299—or ex-
tended parallel litigation in multiple countries also undermines the value of re-
pose,300 which can have business and reputational importance beyond the four 
corners of any given litigation. Third, other kinds of costs may arise in foreign 
litigation. For example, foreign discovery regimes are typically less protective 
of attorney-client privilege and business secrets.301 In addition, the new frontier 
of litigation in several foreign jurisdictions is still a work in progress. The un-
certainty and risk associated with a jury trial and other aspects of U.S. litigation 
are exchanged for the uncertainty and risk arising from less familiar fora that 
may still be developing their private litigation rules.302 In cases brought in for-
eign courts in the first instance, moreover, U.S. defendants will probably be 
stuck there because most foreign courts afford defendants only a limited oppor-
 
294. See Quintanilla & Whytock, supra note 184, at 48, 49 & n.61. 
295. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text. 
296. See, e.g., Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 
F.3d 1199, 1202-04 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, 
Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1173-74 
(1992) (providing evidence undermining assumptions that juries are more plaintiff friendly 
than judges). 
297. See supra note 208. 
298. Cf., e.g., Can v. MD Helicopters, Inc., No. 1 CA-CV 10-0367, 2011 WL 1483783, 
at *1-2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2011) (dismissing the case on forum non conveniens 
grounds, despite the appellants’ contention that “‘most of the documentary evidence and 
witnesses’ they need to prove their product liability case are ‘located . . . in the United 
States’”). 
299. See M. Ryan Casey & Barrett Ristroph, Boomerang Litigation: How Convenient Is 
Forum Non Conveniens in Transnational Litigation?, 4 BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 21, 22 
& n.3 (2007). 
300. See Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 
1989 DUKE L.J. 281, 290 (“Repose is a social and political value with economic conse-
quences.”). 
301. See, e.g., Joined Cases T-125/03 & T-253/03, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. v. 
Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3532, II-3573 (Ct. First Instance); Antonio Lordi, The Attorney-
Client Privilege in the European Union and Italy: Time for a Change, 11 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 47, 
48 (2008). But cf. Kathryn Chalmers & Andrew Cunningham, Privilege from Canadian and 
U.S. Perspectives: Reverence vs. Skepticism, 19 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 297, 298 (2013) (not-
ing ways in which the Canadian privilege doctrine is more protective than the American 
one). 
302. Nowhere was this risk more apparent, at least in retrospect, than in the Chev-
ron/Ecuador case. See Gómez, supra note 194, at 434-44. 
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tunity to reverse forum shop. 303  Although foreign courts are increasingly 
adopting some of the more plaintiff-friendly aspects of U.S. litigation culture, 
most do not have comparable avoidance doctrines that give defendants oppor-
tunities for reverse forum shopping.304  
U.S. defendants have already sometimes come to regret having moved for 
forum non conveniens dismissal to another forum, later requesting U.S. courts 
to block enforcement of the resulting unfavorable foreign judgments. The two 
most famous examples of such “boomerang” litigation are the Dow/Nicaragua 
case described in the Introduction and the Chevron/Ecuador litigation.305 When 
those cases were first dismissed from U.S. courts on forum non conveniens 
grounds, few would have suspected that the plaintiffs could have sued in their 
home countries with a hope for large judgments. It was only after the first dis-
trict court dismissals in those cases that both countries enacted legislation that 
paved the way for billions of dollars in judgments.306 In the Chevron/Ecuador 
case, which arose out of alleged oil contamination in the Amazon, the Ecuado-
rian litigation yielded an $18 billion judgment and years of fighting over judg-
ment enforcement in an assortment of jurisdictions, including the United 
States.307 In the Nicaragua case, as mentioned above, the defendants’ initial at-
tempts to block enforcement of the judgments themselves ran aground because 
of avoidance doctrines.308 
These cases present cautionary tales. Perhaps they are just extreme exam-
ples. What appear to have been corrupt and unfair procedures in Nicaragua and 
Ecuador led to the enormous judgments, which, in the Nicaragua case, were ul-
timately (and rightly) found unenforceable. 309  The developments described 
 
303. In contrast to “the rest of the world,” U.S. courts are focused on defendants’ 
rights—protected through principles such as personal jurisdiction and forum non 
conveniens—rather than plaintiff access to courts. Brand, supra note 229, at 79.  
304. See id. at 82 (discussing personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens as pro-
tecting defendants); Tobias Kraetzschmar & Philipp K. Wagner, Responding to Differing 
Procedural Concepts in U.S.-German Cross-Border Disputes, 23 N.Y. ST. B.A. INT’L L. 
PRACTICUM 34, 34 (2010); Nougayrède, supra note 21, at 448 (advocating more use of fo-
rum non conveniens); supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
305. See Casey & Ristroph, supra note 299, at 31-40. 
306. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (describing the Dow/Nicaragua case). In 
the Chevron/Ecuador litigation, the U.S. district court first dismissed the case on the basis of 
forum non conveniens in 1996. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996), vacated sub nom. Jota v. Texaco Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998). After Ecuador 
passed the Environmental Management Act in 1999, the plaintiffs filed suit in that country as 
well. Gómez, supra note 194, at 436. Meanwhile, the forum non conveniens litigation con-
tinued in U.S. court until the Second Circuit finally affirmed the forum non conveniens dis-
missal in 2002. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 2002). 
307. See Gómez, supra note 194, at 430-31. 
308. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text. 
309. See Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1312-21 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (de-
scribing the unfairness of the Nicaraguan litigation), aff’d sub nom. Osorio v. Dow Chem. 
Co., 635 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2011). I am not aware of a court finding the Chevron judgment 
unenforceable, see, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Yaiguaje, 2014 CanLII 16022 (S.C.C.) (granting 
leave to appeal the suit over enforcement), but a federal court in New York has issued a 
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here, however, suggest that unfavorable judgments may increasingly come be-
fore U.S. courts under circumstances that American judges will be far more 
willing to endorse.310 When that happens, an American court will likely recog-
nize and enforce the foreign judgment in a case that it might have resolved dif-
ferently.311  
If this is all true, then cutting back on litigation isolationism could be an ef-
fort to save American defendants from themselves—that is, to limit their ability 
to opt for dismissals in situations where in the long run and in their collective 
interest they should proceed with the case in U.S. court. Such a crusade may be 
unappealing to some.  
But litigation isolationism also has unappreciated effects on U.S. sovereign 
interests more broadly defined. As I have argued elsewhere, the combination of 
litigation isolationism at the front end with relatively liberal foreign-judgment 
enforcement rules at the back end can result in delegating to foreign courts the 
power to resolve disputes involving U.S. parties that Congress or the states in-
tended to be covered by American law. 312  Such delegation—regardless of 
whether enforcement of the judgment is later sought in the United States, but 
all the more so if it is—may undermine broader U.S. interests in several ways.  
First, U.S. courts forgo the opportunity to apply American procedures—
and the policies behind them—to cases with strong U.S. ties. Whatever one’s 
views on the goals of American procedure,313 those goals are rarely vindicated 
by dismissing cases and discouraging plaintiffs from filing in U.S. courts. 
Second, in a situation where a U.S. court and a foreign court would reach 
different conclusions about which substantive law should apply to a given dis-
pute, the United States, through avoidance doctrines, forgoes not only the pow-
er to decide the choice-of-law question, but also the opportunity to have its law 
applied.314 This happened in the seminal forum non conveniens case of Piper 
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno.315 The lower courts had determined that Pennsylvania 
law should apply but that Scotland would find that its own law applied.316 The 
Supreme Court’s decision to enforce the district court’s forum non conveniens 
 
nearly 300-page opinion documenting the corruption in the Ecuadorian litigation leading to 
that award, see Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
310. See Quintanilla & Whytock, supra note 184, at 35-36 (noting the growth of for-
eign-judgment enforcement actions). 
311. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
312. See Bookman, supra note 17, at 35-36. Of course, the question of Congress’s in-
tent underlies the presumption against extraterritoriality itself. 
313. See Richard Marcus, ‘American Exceptionalism’ in Goals for Civil Litigation, in 
GOALS OF CIVIL JUSTICE AND CIVIL PROCEDURE IN CONTEMPORARY JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 123 
(Alan Uzelac ed., 2014) (discussing debates about the goals of American procedure beyond 
conflict resolution). 
314. See Noll, supra note 23, at 42 (arguing that avoidance doctrines and other devel-
opments yield a “new conflicts law” that “cede[s] power to coordinate legal systems”). 
315. 454 U.S. 235, 243, 247, 259-60 (1981). 
316. Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 163, 168 (3d Cir. 1980), rev’d, 454 
U.S. 235. 
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dismissal upset the previous understanding that forum non conveniens should 
not apply if choice-of-law analysis indicated that U.S. law would apply to the 
dispute.317 Today, choice-of-law analysis is typically conducted only after a 
case has survived a forum non conveniens motion to dismiss, but forum non 
conveniens dismissals are still disproportionately likely in suits where foreign 
law just might apply.318 
Third, by pursuing litigation isolationism, U.S. courts are unilaterally de-
ciding to limit the U.S. role in the emerging market for transnational litigation, 
a market in which the United States began as a principal player (although that, 
too, was primarily a judicially driven position). There are benefits to competing 
more actively in this market. Several countries have begun to recognize the 
economic value of exporting domestic law, particularly in the transnational 
commercial context.319 The U.S. legal market and other parts of the economy 
currently gross substantial sums from transnational litigation.320 American de-
cisions still disproportionately influence world understandings of domestic and 
international law issues, although some argue that influence is diminishing.321  
 Avoidance doctrines either ignore or do not value these benefits. Or per-
haps they assume that transnational commercial litigation can be promoted at 
the same time that transnational tort litigation is shunned.322 
 This may have some positive effects from a global perspective. But it has 
negative effects not only on U.S. control over suits involving its own nationals 
and regulation of conduct and harms that occur within its territory, but also on 
U.S. global influence.323 
 
317. See Stein, supra note 78, at 828 & n.204. 
318. See Childress, supra note 3, at 170 (“[W]hen a federal court is asked to adjudicate 
a case filed by a foreign plaintiff where foreign law is arguably applicable, the trend is to 
dismiss in favor of a foreign forum.”). This makes sense insofar as forum non conveniens is 
meant to protect courts from undertaking complicated choice-of-law analysis. 
319. Vogenauer, supra note 292, at 30-32; see also MINISTRY OF JUSTICE & UK TRADE 
& INV., PLAN FOR GROWTH: PROMOTING THE UK’S LEGAL SERVICES SECTOR (2011),  
available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/corporate-reports/MoJ/legal 
-services-action-plan.pdf. 
320. See Exorbitant Privilege, ECONOMIST (May 10, 2014), http://www.economist.com 
/news/international/21601858-american-and-english-law-and-lawyers-have-stranglehold 
-cross-border-business-may. 
321. Compare ANTHEA ROBERTS, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL?: A STUDY IN 
THE GLOBALIZATION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND SCHOLARSHIP (forthcoming 2015) (manu-
script at 51) (on file with author) (arguing that “legal globalization has strongly privileged 
certain legal systems, most notably those of the United States and the United Kingdom,” as 
developers of international law), with David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influ-
ence of the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 850 (2012) (rebutting the 
conventional wisdom that U.S. constitutionalism guides foreign constitution making). 
322. See supra note 11 (noting the coexistence of developments encouraging transna-
tional commercial litigation—for example, by strongly enforcing forum selection clauses—
and developments discouraging transnational tort cases). 
323. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 79 (2004) (arguing that fail-
ure to participate in transnational judicial dialogue “can sharply diminish the influence of 
any individual national court”). 
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Fourth, as Cassandra Burke Robertson has argued, there are additional 
economic and political consequences of systematically dismissing cases against 
American defendants. To the extent that the U.S. tort system seeks to place the 
cost of defective products on the manufacturer, immunizing U.S. manufacturers 
from that system when they cause harm abroad skews incentives to make the 
product safer, even when the same products are sold domestically.324 Related-
ly, in response to transnational litigation avoidance in the United States, other 
countries may enact blocking statutes or otherwise disfavor foreign investment 
in or trade with U.S. companies.325 
2. Suits against foreign defendants 
Avoiding suits against foreign defendants likewise has negative ramifica-
tions for American interests, particularly if such suits are substantially more 
likely to be dismissed than suits against American defendants. Dismissing cases 
against foreign defendants but permitting them against U.S. defendants lessens 
the competitive disadvantage that foreign corporations doing business in the 
United States used to bear as a consequence of being subject to suit there. But it 
exacerbates the “litigation tax” on American companies. 326 The forum non 
conveniens safety valve for domestic defendants provides some relief from this 
burden, but the doctrine’s application is too uncertain to equalize the status of 
U.S. and foreign companies in this regard. Companies incorporated or head-
quartered in the United States remain subject to personal jurisdiction in at least 
the state of their incorporation and principal place of business, and are no long-
er similarly situated with the foreign corporations doing business alongside 
them abroad. Foreign companies, meanwhile, gain immunity from U.S. liability 
for harm to Americans, even if federal or state substantive law would regulate 
such conduct according to state choice-of-law rules.327 The resulting regime 
not only discriminates against American companies, it also provides disincen-
tives for companies to incorporate or locate their headquarters in the United 
States, which harms U.S. economic interests as a whole.328  
Foreign court developments somewhat mitigate the impact of this discrim-
ination. Multinational corporations increasingly will be subject to suit abroad 
and may not be able to avoid liability in their home courts or in the courts of 
those countries where they may have caused harm. Royal Dutch Shell, the de-
 
324. Robertson, supra note 71, at 1109-10.  
325. Id. at 1111-12. 
326. See Kenneth Anderson, Supreme Court to Review Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler, 
OPINIO JURIS (July 17, 2013, 12:17 PM EDT), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/07/17/supreme 
-court-to-review-bauman-v-daimlerchrysler (“Kiobel has the effect of favoring economic 
activity abroad by foreign corporations and disfavoring US corporations.”). 
327. See Noll, supra note 23, at 63-64. 
328. But see infra notes 383-84 and accompanying text (discussing the legal benefits of 
incorporating in the United States). 
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fendant in Kiobel,329 has been sued in major transnational tort suits in both the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom.330 And with respect to conduct or harms 
that occur in the nations that have expanding litigation cultures, those nations’ 
courts will likely entertain suits arising from that conduct or those harms.331 
The winners of this recalibrated transnational litigation system that litiga-
tion isolationism helps create, then, are not U.S. parties, or an undifferentiated 
class of “foreign defendants,” but multinational companies incorporated and 
headquartered in tax havens or states outside of the trends discussed here. 
Those entities may be able to escape a litigation tax and liability entirely for 
conduct abroad as well as, potentially, in the United States.332  
3. Suits brought by U.S. plaintiffs 
The consequence of both the strengthening of the presumption against ex-
traterritoriality and the changes in personal jurisdiction has been to limit Amer-
ican plaintiffs’ access to U.S. courts in transnational cases. This result is obvi-
ously detrimental to plaintiffs’ interests.333 It is likewise detrimental to par-
ties—namely, corporations—that typically identify as defendants.  
Appearing as a plaintiff or a defendant is not an immutable characteristic. 
Particularly for corporate entities, today’s defendant may be tomorrow’s plain-
tiff. In some circumstances, of course, corporations may want to initiate law-
suits, and in their capacity as plaintiffs, they may regret having advocated for 
the expansion of avoidance doctrines.334 More to the point, even in the course 
of a single dispute, the parties may switch their locations vis-à-vis the “v.” If a 
would-be defendant wants to take advantage of a U.S. forum by way of a de-
claratory judgment action, for example, avoidance doctrines may block such 
efforts.335 Likewise, if a foreign court defendant tries to block enforcement of 
 
329. Royal Dutch Petroleum, the named defendant in Kiobel, ceased to exist in 2005. 
See Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (Archive), SHELL GLOBAL, http://www.shell.com 
/global/aboutshell/investor/shareholder-information/unification-archive/rd-archive.html (last 
visited Apr. 28, 2015). 
330. See supra notes 244, 251-54 and accompanying text. 
331. See, e.g., Halfmeier, supra note 183, at 447-48 (arguing that the end of American 
hegemony over transnational torts creates a vacuum that can be filled to some extent by Eu-
ropean courts). 
332. See Noll, supra note 23, at 44 (discussing disabling of U.S. regulatory systems). 
333. The bulk of domestic scholarship addressing the retraction of U.S. jurisdiction fo-
cuses on the resulting harms to plaintiffs. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: Con-
temporary Judicial Hostility to Small-Claims Consumer Class Actions, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 
305, 305-08 (2010); Miller, supra note 67, at 469. When focusing on transnational litigation, 
it is important to note that these harms apply to American as well as foreign plaintiffs. 
334. See, e.g., InduSoft, Inc. v. Taccolini, 560 F. App’x 245, 246-48, 252-53 (5th Cir. 
2014) (per curiam) (affirming forum non conveniens dismissal in a case brought by a Texas 
software company). 
335. See, e.g., Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Chimet, S.p.A., 619 F.3d 288, 291 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(dismissing a declaratory judgment suit on forum non conveniens grounds); ITL Int’l, Inc. v. 
Ninoshka, S.A., No. 01:10-cv-23493-JLK, 2011 WL 3205590, at *5-6 (S.D. Fla. July 27, 
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the judgment, avoidance doctrines may bar it from suing the original plaintiffs 
in U.S. court. This happened early on in the enforcement proceedings in the 
Dow/Nicaragua case: Dow’s declaratory judgment action to block enforcement 
of the Nicaraguan judgment was dismissed for want of personal jurisdiction.336  
It is difficult, however, to remedy directly the problem of excluding U.S. 
plaintiffs’ suits. Grounding jurisdiction on the basis of the plaintiff’s nationali-
ty—known as “passive personality jurisdiction”—is widely recognized as un-
fair outside the scope of prosecuting terrorists.337 Other means of limiting liti-
gation isolationism may therefore be the best way of ensuring that U.S. parties 
have access to U.S. courts.338 
C. Isolationism in Context 
Litigation isolationism has been fueled by the confluence of several unre-
lated doctrines that have developed largely in isolation from each other, as well 
as from the rest of the world. Although the doctrines purport to consider inter-
national comity, what they mean by this is unclear. The “at home” rule for gen-
eral jurisdiction is internationally respected. 339  But neither forum non 
conveniens nor abstention comity follow or even consider worldwide ap-
proaches to the issues they confront; their approaches to comity are more ad 
hoc. Morrison and Kiobel, meanwhile, reached outcomes that foreign sover-
eigns had pushed in amicus briefs but did not adopt an international-law-based 
rule as those briefs had urged.340 
Although they cite the same goals, moreover, the effects of these doctrines 
have butted against each other. On one hand, Goodyear and Daimler have 
 
2011) (relying on international comity and other principles to decline to exercise jurisdiction 
over a suit brought by a U.S. company). 
336. Dow Chem. Co. v. Calderon, 422 F.3d 827, 829 (9th Cir. 2005); see also, e.g., Ya-
hoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 379 F.3d 1120, 1121 (9th Cir. 
2004) (dismissing the case for lack of personal jurisdiction), aff’d on other grounds on reh’g 
en banc, 433 F.3d 1199, 1211 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding personal jurisdiction while acknowl-
edging that the issue was a close call). 
337. See Clermont & Palmer, supra note 221, at 474-78 (explaining criticisms of 
French plaintiff-based “exorbitant” jurisdiction). 
338. See, e.g., Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securi-
ties Law: Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 14, 37-38 (2007) 
(“[S]ecurities claims involving U.S. plaintiffs are less likely to be dismissed—not just be-
cause of the general presumption in favor of their choice of forum, but because the claims of 
U.S. nationals more strongly implicate local regulatory interests.” (footnote omitted)). 
339. See Brand, supra note 229, at 78. 
340. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013); Morrison v. 
Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 269-70 (2010); Brief of the Governments of the King-
dom of the Netherlands & the United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 11-16, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491), 2012 
WL 2312825; Brief of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of the Defendants-Appellees at 23-27, Morrison, 561 U.S. 247 (No. 08-1191), 
2010 WL 723006. 
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brought U.S. general jurisdiction principles into line with international practice 
recognizing a defendant’s home as the most logical (and presumptively valid) 
forum for suit.341 It is a practice that, if truly adopted worldwide, would guar-
antee at least one reasonable forum for every suit. Scholars have noted that this 
is a positive development so long as specific jurisdiction fills gaps left open by 
restricting general jurisdiction in cases in which the United States has a legiti-
mate sovereign interest.342 But the Supreme Court’s interpretation of specific 
jurisdiction, most recently in the Nicastro plurality, calls into doubt whether 
specific jurisdiction can play that role.343  
Today’s forum non conveniens, moreover, undermines the promise of a 
general jurisdiction regime based on the defendant’s home in a different way. 
One of the most internationally controversial aspects of forum non conveniens 
is that it provides a high likelihood of home-forum immunity for U.S. defend-
ants.344 It permits U.S. courts to dismiss cases brought against U.S. defendants, 
even though the court otherwise has jurisdiction, often simply because the court 
determines another court is “more suitable.” 345  The rationales underlying 
Goodyear and Daimler’s concept of all-purpose “at home” jurisdiction are at 
loggerheads with the functional home-forum immunity that forum non 
conveniens affords.  
Home-forum immunity is widely disdained in part because it would un-
dermine global access to courts if it were widely accepted. Home-forum im-
munity would also short-circuit any case in which a plaintiff from one nation 
(maybe the United States) sought to sue a defendant from another nation in its 
home forum, leaving a large category of cases—including some brought by 
U.S. plaintiffs—with no forum at all in which to sue.  
This further demonstrates that territoriality, though an important question 
when considering forum availability for transnational litigation, is not the only 
one. Personality—in the form of either nationality or domicile—must also play 
a role in establishing a workable international marketplace for transnational lit-
igation. If the United States leads the charge in providing its nationals with 
 
341. See supra note 163 and accompanying text; Silberman, supra note 53, at 601 
(“[Goodyear] brings general jurisdiction more closely in line with that of other countries.”). 
342. See Borchers, supra note 64, at 4; Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of “Essentially at 
Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C. L. REV. 527, 542 (2012); Mary Twitchell, The Myth of 
General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 676 (1988) (“[W]e do not need to justify 
broad exercises of dispute-blind jurisdiction unless our interpretation of the scope of specific 
jurisdiction unreasonably limits state authority over nonresident defendants.”). 
343. See Stein, supra note 342, at 542. 
344. See Lear, supra note 141, at 563 (noting that “routinely dismissing foreign claims 
against American multinationals” raises comity concerns); Robertson, supra note 71, at 
1092-94 (describing other countries’ retaliatory legislation in response to forum non 
conveniens dismissals); see also supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text. 
345. See Stein, supra note 78, at 784-85; supra note 77 and accompanying text. But cf. 
Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Life Receivables Ir. Ltd., [2008] 2 I.L.R.M. 460 (H. Ct.) (Ir.) 
(finding that an Irish court’s jurisdiction over an Irish defendant was mandatory, despite the 
existence of a parallel duplicative suit filed earlier in U.S. court). 
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home-forum immunity in transnational cases brought in U.S. court, then Amer-
icans seeking access to foreign courts may pay the price. 
IV. REFINING AVOIDANCE 
Thus far, this Article has demonstrated that avoidance doctrines should be 
reconsidered. Scholars have suggested a variety of ways to reconfigure them. 
Some have suggested revisions to personal jurisdiction inquiries,346 the forum 
non conveniens analysis,347 abstention comity,348 and the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.349 Others have argued that Congress should play a larger role 
in defining some or all of these doctrines.350 Still others have pushed for inter-
national cooperation.351 
This Part considers ways to reorient all four avoidance doctrines around 
territoriality and personality.352 These concepts provide presumptively valid, 
and internationally uncontested, bases for prescriptive and adjudicatory juris-
diction.353 Grounding avoidance doctrines on these principles would better ad-
 
346. See, e.g., Childress, supra note 234, at 1548 (proposing a multipart default rule for 
transnational personal jurisdiction cases); Stephen E. Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Per-
sonal Jurisdiction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1301, 1303 (2014) (suggesting “a system of nation-
wide federal personal jurisdiction”). 
347. See, e.g., Lear, supra note 141, at 602-03; Robertson, supra note 71, at 1114 & 
n.212; Stein, supra note 78, at 785-86; Margaret G. Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens: A 
Doctrine in Search of a Role, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1324 (1986) (arguing that the doctrine 
should be abolished). 
348. See, e.g., Parrish, supra note 12, at 244 (advocating a “modified lis alibi pendens 
principle” and reversal of the current presumption against abstention comity); Martin H. 
Redish, Intersystemic Redundancy and Federal Court Power: Proposing a Zero Tolerance 
Solution to the Duplicative Litigation Problem, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1349 (2000). 
349. See, e.g., Born, supra note 38, at 1-2 (arguing that the presumption against extra-
territoriality should be abandoned and replaced with an “international law” presumption); 
Zachary D. Clopton, Replacing the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 94 B.U. L. REV. 
1, 2 (2014) (calling for replacing the presumption against extraterritoriality with the Charm-
ing Betsy doctrine for private civil litigation); John H. Knox, A Presumption Against 
Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 351, 353, 355-61 (2010) (proposing a clarified 
presumption against extrajurisdictionality). 
350. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 71, at 1087, 1127-30. 
351. See, e.g., Childress, supra note 27, at 9. 
352. Personality can take the form of either nationality or domicile. See MILLS, supra 
note 93, at 248-52. Nationality generally refers to citizenship and is a basis for prescriptive 
jurisdiction, whereas domicile refers to residence and is a basis for adjudicative jurisdiction. 
Id. For a corporate entity, the place of incorporation determines both the corporation’s na-
tionality and its domicile. See JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure 
Ltd., 536 U.S. 88, 91 (2002) (using place of incorporation to determine nationality); see also 
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014) (using it to determine a corporation’s “at 
home” status). A corporation’s principal place of business can provide an additional domi-
cile, and sometimes an additional nationality. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760 (defining “at 
home”); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2013) (“[A] corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of 
every State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign 
state where it has its principal place of business . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
353. They also form the basis for venue in the federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). 
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dress separation of powers and international comity concerns. Courts would 
have a clearer way of establishing a level of transnational litigation in U.S. 
courts that would be unlikely to offend foreign nations by entertaining either 
“too much” or “too little” transnational litigation. Moreover, there is general 
international agreement that territoriality and personality are acceptable bases 
for jurisdiction,354 and there are international comity concerns when countries 
fail to exercise jurisdiction on those bases. This approach would also advance 
important U.S. sovereign interests—for example, the interest that U.S. proce-
dures, U.S. choice-of-law rules, and ultimately, where appropriate, U.S. sub-
stantive law rules apply in cases involving Americans and events or harms in 
the United States. And, as discussed above,355 using this approach to establish 
a baseline of jurisdiction generates certain long-term benefits for American de-
fendants, as well as, of course, for plaintiffs. 
Ideally, realignment along these lines would be achieved through interna-
tional cooperation and/or federal legislation.356 Although doctrinally distinct, 
each area discussed here could probably be superseded by statute: Justice Ken-
nedy suggested that the result in Nicastro could be changed by statute;357 fo-
rum non conveniens and abstention comity could likely be amended by stat-
ute; 358  and extraterritoriality decisions can be, and often have been, 
“overruled” by statute.359 Legislation informed by an international treaty on 
jurisdiction, which the executive branch helped to initiate in the 1990s,360 
could assuage separation of powers concerns arising from courts setting rules 
for U.S. transnational litigation, and would likely promote international comity. 
One hopes it would also provide greater clarity and predictability.  
Efforts at international agreement and statutory guidance on these issues, 
however, have foundered for decades.361 In the absence of treaties and statutes, 
 
354. With respect to prescriptive jurisdiction, territoriality and nationality are recog-
nized bases under international law. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(1)(a), (2) (1987). With respect to adjudicative jurisdiction, ter-
ritoriality and domicile are widely adopted and not considered exorbitant. Id. § 421; see, e.g., 
Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 60, art. 2(1). 
355. See supra Part III.B. 
356. See, e.g., Childress, supra note 27, at 47. 
357. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2790 (2011) (plurality opin-
ion); see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 n.* (1987) (de-
clining to address the question). 
358. See Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 833-35 
(2008) (describing the debate over whether Congress can abrogate procedural common law 
rules, including forum non conveniens and abstention). 
359. See supra Part I.A.4. 
360. See Borchers, supra note 64, at 18. 
361. See id. at 18-20 (describing attempts to design a judgments convention and arguing 
that such a convention is unlikely now); Silberman, supra note 53, at 604-05 (describing 
proposed federal statutes to clarify jurisdictional standards over foreign defendants after 
Nicastro); Arthur T. von Mehren, Drafting a Convention on International Jurisdiction and 
the Effects of Foreign Judgments Acceptable World-Wide: Can the Hague Conference Pro-
ject Succeed?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 191, 195-96 (2001) (explaining the impasse in negotia-
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courts are left to work out these issues on their own. Because court domination 
of this area is the current reality, the important question is how judges should 
define the confines of their discretion and how they should exercise that discre-
tion. 
The remainder of this Part discusses the benefits of linking avoidance doc-
trines more closely to internationally accepted principles of personality as well 
as territoriality and suggests doctrinal routes for doing so. 
A. Attainable (and Unattainable) Goals  
This Article has identified a series of goals that courts have articulated as 
the aims of avoidance: protecting separation of powers, international comity, 
and defendants’ convenience. These goals are not always compatible, and 
sometimes work against each other or are simply orthogonal. For example, de-
fendants’ interests can stand at cross-purposes to U.S. sovereign interests in en-
suring that U.S. law governs Americans when it is intended to do so. It is there-
fore worthwhile to identify which of these goals are attainable as well as which 
should take precedence.  
First, there is the concern that transnational litigation requires courts to 
tread on foreign relations, disrupting separation of powers. But some separation 
of powers conflicts may be inevitable.362 There is inherently a potential institu-
tional conflict between courts’ traditional and constitutional role in defining 
court access rules and interpreting statutes, Congress’s authority to regulate ju-
risdiction, and the executive branch’s dominant role in foreign relations.363 Bill 
Dodge has argued that the way for courts to avoid interfering with foreign af-
fairs is to ensure that courts apply comity doctrines and that the executive 
branch has no role in their application.364 But that approach still requires de-
signing courts’ guidelines for how to exercise their discretion to interfere min-
imally with the political branches’ foreign relations prerogatives. The “sensitive 
issues of the authority of the Executive over relations with foreign nations”365 
present less of a concern when the defendants are American. 
Second, there is the international comity concern. To the extent that avoid-
ance has resulted in U.S. courts entertaining too few transnational cases, foreign 
 
tions for a judgments convention on jurisdiction and foreign judgments in civil and commer-
cial matters). 
362. See supra notes 270-71 and accompanying text. 
363. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. Cf. Robertson, supra note 71, at 1128-
30 (advocating legislative and treaty-based revisions to forum non conveniens, in the interest 
of interbranch cooperation to address the issue, rather than acknowledging inherent branch 
conflicts).  
364. See Dodge, supra note 91, at 40-44. This is the framework of the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act. See id. at 43-44. 
365. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 265 (1991) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (quoting NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979)) (internal 
quotation mark omitted). 
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sovereigns’ reactions have taken two main forms: opposition to U.S. defend-
ants’ home-forum immunity and opposition to perceived prejudice against for-
eign plaintiffs.366 Both of these practices primarily result from the evolution of 
the forum non conveniens analysis and could be ameliorated by changing some 
of the assumptions underlying forum non conveniens. 
Third, defendant inconvenience is, perhaps obviously, an inevitable charac-
teristic of transnational litigation. Recent developments have strengthened the 
basis for the forum non conveniens presumption that the alternative forum is 
“available.” But the same developments should also undermine the presump-
tion that foreign plaintiffs choose U.S. courts to “oppress[] and vex[]” the de-
fendant “out of all proportion to plaintiff’s convenience,”367 especially when 
the defendant is American. Filing the same suit in multiple fora simultaneously, 
however, may be more suggestive of intent to harass. 
When does such inconvenience rise to a level that warrants dismissing a 
case? A more balanced approach to this question—one that would appreciate 
the perspectives of plaintiffs as well as defendants—should consider the inter-
ests of fairness and judicial economy before “convenience.” Forum non 
conveniens and abstention comity both pursue these values, but in different 
ways. Forum non conveniens permits courts to combine these considerations in 
relatively indiscriminate fashion. This broad discretion, moreover, arguably has 
stunted the growth of abstention comity or any other doctrine that specifically 
targets the problems of duplicative litigation.368 
Finally, courts should be concerned with other U.S. sovereign interests 
compromised by litigation isolationism, such as the interest in hearing Ameri-
cans’ disputes in American courts, in having American choice-of-law rules de-
termine when American law applies to American parties, and in participating in 
the expanding market for transnational litigation. Recognizing the presumptive 
validity of jurisdiction over cases against U.S. nationals, however, can go a 
long way in addressing these concerns. 
B. Guiding Principles 
To keep courts from unnecessarily infringing on foreign affairs and dis-
rupting international comity, American courts’ understanding of international 
comity interests in transnational cases should be informed by international 
practice, which generally recognizes territoriality and personality as valid bases 
for exercising adjudicative and prescriptive jurisdiction. 
 
366. See supra notes 275-78 and accompanying text. 
367. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981) (quoting Koster v. 
(Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947)) (internal quotation mark omit-
ted). 
368. See, e.g., Windt v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 529 F.3d 183, 191 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(affirming dismissal of a parallel duplicative suit under forum non conveniens). 
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Of the four avoidance doctrines discussed here, only general jurisdiction 
now parallels widely accepted international practice.369 Specific personal juris-
diction in the United States is more limited than it is in many foreign coun-
tries.370 American forum non conveniens may be more ready to dismiss a case 
than even other common law versions of the doctrine; most civil law countries 
eschew the concept altogether.371 The anti-extraterritoriality presumption likely 
goes even further than international law requires in contracting the long arm of 
U.S. regulatory statutes.372 Abstention comity, on the other hand, likely fails to 
direct courts to stay their hand whenever lis pendens would have directed for-
eign courts to defer to the court where a parallel litigation was first filed.373 
This is not to say that the United States must conform all of its laws to in-
ternationally accepted standards. Nor is there a need to engage in the debate 
over the role of international law in U.S. law or even the existence of interna-
tional law in this area.374 Rather, grounding jurisdiction in the two most basic, 
least controversial bases of adjudicatory and prescriptive jurisdiction—
personality as well as territoriality—is a good idea. It would promote both in-
ternational comity and the American sovereign interests identified here.  
Note that half of the decisions focused on here already purport to do this. 
But the other half get in their way. The presumption against extraterritoriality, 
of course, already takes the approach of resting on territoriality—the place 
where the conduct at issue occurred—as a presumptively valid nexus to justify 
an American court entertaining and applying U.S. law to a case that has other 
foreign aspects. But Nicastro calls into question whether specific personal ju-
risdiction will be available even for cases arising out of harms felt within the 
United States.375 
Similarly, in Daimler, the Court accepted the defendant’s domicile as a val-
id nexus for adjudicatory jurisdiction.376 But forum non conveniens (as well as, 
to some extent, the presumption against extraterritoriality and abstention comi-
 
369. See Brand, supra note 229, at 78 (noting that most legal systems permit general ju-
risdiction over domiciliary defendants); supra Part I.A.1. 
370. See Silberman, supra note 53, at 606-09. 
371. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
372. As it is understood in the United States, international law recognizes a number of 
bases for prescriptive jurisdiction beyond territoriality, within reasonable bounds. RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402-403 (1987); 
GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES 
COURTS 595-98 (5th ed. 2011). 
373. See supra Part I.A.3. 
374. See, e.g., Born, supra note 122, at 19-20 (discussing the debate over the existence 
of international law on adjudicatory jurisdiction); Andrew L. Strauss, Beyond National Law: 
The Neglected Role of the International Law of Personal Jurisdiction in Domestic Courts, 36 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 373, 375 n.9, 378 n.17 (1995). 
375. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011) (plurality 
opinion). 
376. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014). 
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ty) provides ways for domestic defendants nevertheless to avoid transnational 
suits in their home fora.  
The doctrinal shifts proposed in the next Subpart aim to counteract these 
inconsistencies. Reinforcing the role of territoriality and personality as valid 
bases for jurisdiction and venue would better serve the avoidance doctrines’ 
stated goals. It would also mitigate separation of powers concerns in two ways. 
First, it would alleviate concerns about courts declining to exercise legislatively 
granted jurisdiction by making such dismissals less frequent.377 Second, rein-
forcing U.S. courts’ commitment to the personality principle is similar to fol-
lowing a Charming Betsy rule that Congress intends to regulate in accord with 
international law.378 Like the Charming Betsy presumption, a personality-based 
presumption would be more likely to keep the United States out of international 
discord, and thus also to avoid separation of powers problems. This approach 
would also do a better job of preventing the United States from offending for-
eign sovereigns to the best of courts’ ability, without requiring courts to evalu-
ate potential foreign relations effects.379  
Keeping cases against American defendants in American courts would also 
address international comity concerns with granting American defendants 
home-forum immunity. After all, territoriality and personality are the metrics 
that the international community uses and would like the United States to 
use.380 And this approach could cut off any trend of states using home-forum 
immunity as a form of deregulation of their nationals’ foreign conduct. This 
would help ensure, albeit indirectly, that American plaintiffs have at least some 
forum available to them for their injuries abroad, even if that forum is not in the 
United States. 
Preserving jurisdiction in cases against American defendants would also 
remedy some of litigation isolationism’s negative effects on U.S. sovereign in-
terests. It would respect the United States’ interest in having its courts resolve 
suits involving U.S. parties and having its choice of law (and, under certain cir-
cumstances, its substantive laws) applied to suits involving those parties. It 
would also promote the United States’ sovereign and economic interest in be-
 
377. See Richard D. Freer, Refracting Domestic and Global Choice-of-Forum Doctrine 
Through the Lens of a Single Case, 2007 BYU L. REV. 959, 975; Martin H. Redish, Absten-
tion, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 74 
(1984) (arguing that judge-made abstention doctrines violate separation of powers). 
378. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (describing 
the assumption that Congress intends to legislate in accord with international law); see also 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 818 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
practice of using international law to limit the extraterritorial reach of statutes is firmly es-
tablished in our jurisprudence.”). 
379. See Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations 
Law, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1395, 1396-97 (1999) (noting that courts are ill equipped for con-
ducting this sort of inquiry).  
380. See Brief of the Governments of the Kingdom of the Netherlands & the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, 
supra note 340, at 11-12. 
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ing a leader in hosting transnational litigation, within the reasonable limits of 
litigation involving U.S. parties. Finally, including a presumption against forum 
non conveniens dismissal in cases involving U.S. defendants, while retaining 
other aspects of courts’ discretion under forum non conveniens and abstention 
comity, would afford courts sufficient flexibility to respond to the complex na-
ture of transnational litigation. 
One potential downside is that this move toward personality could harm 
American companies by creating a competitive disadvantage for them com-
pared to their foreign counterparts. To be sure, litigation isolationism serves the 
U.S. defendant’s interests in any given case, at least in the short term (unless 
and until the case shifts to a foreign court that is less favorable, as happened in 
the DBCP cases381). But there can be some bigger-picture benefits to U.S. 
companies defending suits in their home fora, including maintaining a potential 
home court advantage and avoiding the risks of changing procedures abroad.382 
Moreover, avoidance doctrines, including a more muted version of forum non 
conveniens, remain available to ensure that keeping American defendants in 
American courts is in the interest of fairness and efficiency, if not in the interest 
of overblown concerns for defendant “convenience.”  
Another disadvantage of this proposal may be that it could harm U.S. eco-
nomic interests by discouraging companies from incorporating or locating their 
headquarters in the United States. But there is little evidence that fear of U.S. 
courts—rather than, for example, tax consequences—actually drives compa-
nies’ behavior in choosing where to incorporate or locate their headquarters.383 
Indeed, access to features such as Delaware corporate governance law and pro-
tection of intellectual property rights is considered an advantage of incorporat-
ing in the United States.384 To benefit from these U.S. laws, it is understood 
that one may also be haled into U.S. courts.385  
 
381. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text. 
382. See supra notes 290-311 and accompanying text; see also Robertson, supra note 
71, at 1130 (discussing foreign litigation threats to corporate defendants). 
383. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, The Rising Tax-Electivity of U.S. Corporate Residence, 
64 TAX L. REV. 377 (2011) (describing the trend of tax-driven foreign incorporation deci-
sions). 
384. Indeed, studies seeking to determine why companies choose to incorporate in par-
ticular states rarely (if ever) mention consideration of issues such as jurisdiction as a driving 
force. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorpo-
rate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 411 (2003) (finding that strong antitakeover provisions attract 
corporations); Susan C. Morse, Startup Ltd.: Tax Planning and Initial Incorporation Loca-
tion, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 319, 339 (2013) (identifying legal benefits as reasons to incorporate 
in the United States). 
385. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 317-18 (1981) (plurality opin-
ion). 
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C. Incorporating Territoriality and Personality 
Implementing this emphasis on personality and territoriality takes different 
forms for each of the avoidance doctrines. 
1. Personal jurisdiction 
The Court in Goodyear and Daimler has already brought general personal 
jurisdiction doctrine into line with internationally accepted ideas that domicile 
(as opposed to other kinds of contacts) reflects a valid basis for jurisdiction. 
This rule lays the groundwork for litigation against U.S. defendants in U.S. 
courts. The Daimler decision appropriately considered both comity and the ex-
ecutive branch’s foreign policy interest in establishing a domicile-based floor 
for personal jurisdiction.386 Transnational litigation against foreign defendants 
will therefore find a forum only through specific jurisdiction. But the United 
States has a significant interest in ensuring that its courts hear cases involving 
conduct or harm felt in the United States. To ensure that such cases have a 
home here, courts should adopt an approach to jurisdiction that “g[i]ve[s] prime 
place to reason and fairness,” consistent with Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in 
Nicastro.387 
2. Forum non conveniens  
Under the “at home” rule for general jurisdiction, suits against U.S. de-
fendants seem welcome in U.S. court.388 Forum non conveniens, however, un-
dermines this openness.389 Courts should redesign forum non conveniens so 
that it at least ceases to provide de facto home-forum immunity to U.S. defend-
ants. The original stated factors in the forum non conveniens test are legitimate 
considerations when making determinations about efficient use of judicial re-
sources.390 But the presumptions—de facto and de jure—that have arisen as a 
means of interpreting these factors do not all reflect the current reality of trans-
national litigation. The presumption that an alternative forum is available is ac-
tually appropriate in light of the foreign trends described here. But the pre-
sumption that a foreign plaintiff is more likely to choose a U.S. forum out of 
vexatiousness than convenience is misplaced today. To be sure, plaintiffs do 
not prioritize defendants’ convenience when choosing a forum. But emerging 
trends391 confirm what scholars have been noting for some time now: plain-
 
386. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014). 
387. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2800 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
388. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754; supra Part I.A.1. 
389. See supra Part III.C. 
390. See supra note 75. 
391. See supra Part II.A. 
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tiffs’ forum-shopping choices may be strategic but should not be penalized as 
such.392 
Instead, the same convenience reasoning should be applied to presume that 
a case brought in the defendant’s home forum should remain there, both be-
cause the home forum should be presumptively fair and convenient to the de-
fendant393 and because it is presumptively in the United States’ sovereign in-
terest to entertain suits against its own nationals.394 Piper Aircraft imposed two 
more glosses on forum non conveniens relating to choice of law: first, the fact 
that a less favorable law would apply in a foreign court should not counsel 
against forum non conveniens dismissal,395 and, second, the fact that a finding 
that U.S. choice-of-law rules would direct the application of U.S. law should 
not compel the court to keep the suit. 396 The latter of these interpretations 
should be rejected to preserve the United States’ interest in having its law apply 
to its own nationals when its own choice-of-law rules would so dictate.397 
Revamping forum non conveniens along these lines would better serve in-
ternational comity, separation of powers concerns, and U.S. sovereign interests 
in two ways. First, it would limit home-forum immunity that can offend foreign 
sovereigns, and, second, it would reduce federal courts’ ability to decline con-
gressionally granted jurisdiction and would ensure that U.S. procedures, 
choice-of-law rules, and, where appropriate, substantive law apply. The “con-
venience” factors should consider judicial efficiency (another sovereign inter-
est), not defendant convenience. Concerns about excessive inconvenience to 
defendants, moreover, should instead be addressed by the personal jurisdiction 
inquiry. Due process, not forum non conveniens, should protect defendants 
from the inconvenience of transnational litigation if and when there is a “con-
stitutionally significant ‘burden’” on the defendant’s defense—for example, 
due to the immobility of the defense.398 
3. Abstention comity 
The intent to “oppress and vex” that forum non conveniens seeks to con-
front is increasingly apparent, on the other hand, in the context of duplicative 
parallel litigation brought in multiple countries. Today, forum non conveniens 
 
392. See, e.g., Lowenfeld, supra note 99, at 314. But see Daniel M. Klerman & Greg 
Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2016) (manuscript at 1-2), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2538857 (identifying “fo-
rum selling” as a downside of forum shopping). 
393. See supra note 163. 
394. See Lear, supra note 141, at 568-79. 
395. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 250 (1981). 
396. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
397. Cf. Stein, supra note 78, at 840 (arguing that a court’s decision whether to exercise 
jurisdiction tacitly and inconsistently turns on the court’s judgment about the sovereign in-
terest at stake in the case). 
398. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S 286, 301 (1980) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). 
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and abstention comity overlap considerably as tools to address parallel duplica-
tive transnational litigation, with forum non conveniens, the more flexible doc-
trine, doing most of the heavy lifting.399 A complete assessment of how to ad-
dress the complicated issue of duplicative litigation is beyond the scope of this 
Article. A good place to start reconciling forum non conveniens and abstention 
comity in this context, however, is the American Law Institute (ALI) draft stat-
ute on the recognition and enforcement of foreign country judgments.400 The 
proposal recommends a modified lis pendens approach that would bring the 
United States more into line with international practice in abstaining or staying 
later-filed suits in favor of first-filed suits in other courts.401 This approach 
would better address the problem of plaintiffs who file multiple lawsuits in 
multiple countries than would forum non conveniens and abstention comity be-
cause they are both over- and underinclusive. Forum non conveniens puts dis-
proportionate emphasis on defendant convenience, and abstention comity 
makes judges too reluctant to abstain from exercising jurisdiction. 
The resulting regime looks similar to the recast Brussels I Regulation, the 
rules that govern civil and commercial disputes among residents of the member 
states of the European Union.402 Both regimes would allow general jurisdiction 
at the defendant’s domicile, but likely no further. Likewise, the European mod-
el and Justice Ginsburg’s approach typically allow specific jurisdiction in tort 
cases in the forum where the harm is felt.403 Additionally, the ALI draft statute 
would adopt an approach to parallel duplicative litigation similar to the Brus-
sels I Regulation’s lis pendens model. But it is important to retain some discre-
tion, in the context of forum non conveniens and abstention comity, for circum-
stances in which suits survive basic jurisdictional hurdles but nevertheless have 
very few contacts with the United States, as in Sinochem International Co. v. 
Malaysia International Shipping Corp., for example.404 The discretion is also 
needed to soften the strictness of the lis pendens rule in cases where favoring 
the winner of a race to the courthouse would work an injustice or unduly bur-
den the court.  
It is useful to apply the proposed reconfiguration to the two most recent 
Supreme Court forum non conveniens cases, Sinochem and Piper Aircraft. 
 
399. See Bermann, supra note 17, at 27 (noting U.S. courts’ use of abstention comity 
“on occasion,” and their apparent preference for forum non conveniens to confront situations 
involving duplicative litigation). 
400. AM. LAW INST., RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: 
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE (2006). 
401. Id. § 11; Silberman, supra note 96, at 354-56; see also Parrish, supra note 12, at 
244 (proposing a “modified lis alibi pendens principle” and a reversal of the current pre-
sumption of allowing duplicative litigation to continue). 
402. See Borchers, supra note 64, at 16-18 (describing the Brussels regime). 
403. See id. at 16; J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2800-01 (2011) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (appealing to concepts of fairness and reasonableness). 
404. 549 U.S. 422, 426, 435 (2007) (explaining that the dispute was between two for-
eign entities over an alleged misrepresentation to a foreign court, with parallel proceedings 
underway in China). 
May 2015] LITIGATION ISOLATIONISM 1143 
Sinochem involved “alleged misrepresentations by a Chinese corporation to a 
Chinese admiralty court resulting in the arrest of a Malaysian vessel in Chi-
na.”405 It was, as one would say today, foreign-cubed, involving foreign plain-
tiffs, foreign defendants, and foreign conduct. That suit remains “a textbook 
case for . . . forum non conveniens dismissal”406 under the doctrinal realign-
ment proposed here. But Piper Aircraft, which involved a suit against U.S. de-
fendants and the application of U.S. law,407 would likely stay in U.S. court. 
Likewise, a personality-based regime likely would have prevented the fo-
rum non conveniens dismissal in the DBCP litigation discussed at the outset of 
this Article.408 Consolidation of all of the DBCP cases from across the globe 
against Dow and other American companies arguably would have improved 
defendant “convenience,” and certainly would have improved global judicial 
efficiency by coordinating and streamlining the common issues among cases 
that were scattered to the winds after the forum non conveniens dismissals. The 
United States’ sovereign interests in regulating its own nationals would have 
been preserved, and Nicaragua may have been spared the offense that led it to 
enact the special law under which the Nicaraguan plaintiffs later racked up such 
substantial judgments. 
4. Presumption against extraterritoriality 
Finally, what is to be done about the presumption against extraterritoriali-
ty? Prescriptive jurisdiction is a different beast from the adjudicative jurisdic-
tion and discretionary doctrines just discussed. For our purposes, the relevant 
detail is that the presumption applies to prevent the application of federal law to 
Americans’ conduct abroad.409 One option would be to incorporate a contrary 
presumption that Congress intends to regulate U.S. nationals, even when they 
are acting abroad. Some courts and scholars, for example, have suggested that 
Kiobel should be read to mean that the Alien Tort Statute still applies to U.S. 
nationals.410 While attractive in its outcome, there are several problems with 
this approach, including that it will interfere quite categorically with foreign 
nations’ regulations within their own territories and that it is far from clear that 
 
405. Id. at 426. 
406. Id. at 435. 
407. In Piper Aircraft, two of the four defendants were American, and the district court 
held that Pennsylvania law would have applied to one of the defendants, while the Third Cir-
cuit held that it would have applied to both. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 239, 
243-45 (1981). The Supreme Court did not state its position on the issue, but it expressed 
skepticism about the Third Circuit’s reasoning. See id. at 245 n.11.  
408. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text. 
409. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
410. See, e.g., In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 15 F. Supp. 3d 454, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); 
Doug Cassel, Suing Americans for Human Rights Torts Overseas: The Supreme Court 
Leaves the Door Open, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1773 (2014). 
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Congress legislates with the intention of regulating U.S. nationals wherever 
they are located.  
A better option might be, as others have suggested, replacing the presump-
tion with one that assumes that Congress legislates to the full extent permissible 
under international law,411 or with a Charming Betsy rule.412 Aligning the pre-
sumption with international law should ground the inquiry in ideas of territori-
ality and nationality. Pegging the presumption to international law should also 
do a better job of channeling likely congressional intent, rather than forcing 
Congress’s hand, which is an increasingly difficult proposition.413 These pa-
rameters would do a better job of accommodating considerations of separation 
of powers, comity, and U.S. sovereign interests than the current overly strong 
presumption against extraterritoriality. 
CONCLUSION 
Litigation isolationism results in part from courts viewing two sets of inter-
related subjects in isolation: the four avoidance doctrines themselves and U.S. 
and foreign developments. Both areas are deeply interconnected and should be 
understood as such. When they develop separately from each other, they get in 
each other’s way. For example, what general jurisdiction gives with one 
hand—jurisdiction in a defendant’s home forum—forum non conveniens takes 
away with the other. And what the anti-extraterritoriality presumption recog-
nizes as fundamental—territoriality—recent specific jurisdiction developments 
are prepared to eschew. Likewise, discounting foreign court trends leads to as-
sumptions about plaintiff forum choices that mischaracterize the entire endeav-
or of transnational litigation. Failure to see these doctrines as a coherent whole 
or to view them in a global context leads to the doctrines failing to achieve their 
own stated goals and undermining U.S. sovereign interests. 
 
411. See Born, supra note 349, at 1-2. 
412. See Clopton, supra note 349, at 22-29 (suggesting such a rule for private civil cas-
es). 
413. This would turn the presumption from a preference-eliciting rule to a preference-
estimating one. See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2036-37 (2002) (explaining the difference between statutory interpre-
tation rules that seek to parallel the meaning the enacting Congress intended (preference-
estimating) and those that “intentionally differ[] from likely political preferences in order to 
elicit a political response that will make it clearer just what the government desires” (prefer-
ence-eliciting) (emphasis omitted)). 
